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Taxation of Nonqualifying
Property Distributed in
Reorganizations
Allan J. Samansky *
A number of important tax questions arise when a shareholderreceives boot in
addition to stock as considerationin a reorganizationunder section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under section 356 of the Code the shareholder recognizes any gain up to the amount of boot received This Article analyzes the
applicationofsection 156(a)(2), which determines whether the gain is treatedas ordinary income or capitalgain. The Articlefirst discusses amalgamatingreorganizations where the corporationshad no common ownershi prior to the reorganization
and then examines those reorganizationswhere there was common ownership. The
author advocatesutilization of theprinciples of Code sections 302 and 346 in interpreting section 356(a)(2) and argues thatfor thispurpose the distribution of boot
shouldgenerally be viewed as a distributionby the trans/erorcorporationpriorto the
reorganizaion. In certain reorganizations,however, the author concludes that the
boot should be taxed as a distributionby an ongoing corporationunderCode section
301. The Article concludes by suggesting some amendments to Code section 356.

U-NDER Internal Revenue Code section 368 certain combina-

tions of two or more corporations qualify as "reorganizations."
The tax consequences for a shareholder who exchanges stock in a
reorganization depend on the nature of the property received as
consideration. If the shareholder receives only stock of the acquiring corporation as consideration, section 354 of the Code provides that any gain or loss realized in the exchange will not be
recognized. If the shareholder receives other consideration, usually referred to as "boot,"' in addition to stock of the acquiring
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., Harvard

College (1967); M.A., University of California at Berkeley (1968); J.D., University of Pennsylvania (1974).
1. The term "boot" is used because shareholders of the transferor corporation have
received stock or securities of the acquiring corporation plus money (or other property) to
boot. See Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1956); 64 CONG. REC. 2852
(1923) (remarks of Rep. Green).
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corporation, section 354 does not apply.2 When boot is received,
the shareholder recognizes under section 356(a) any gain realized
in the exchange up to the value of the boot received. Whether
this recognized gain is ordinary income or capital gain is usually
determined by section 356(a)(2). If the exchange has the "effect of
the distribution of a dividend," the amount of the recognized gain
not in excess of the shareholder's ratable share of earnings and
profits "of the corporation" will be treated as a dividend.4
There are a number of unresolved issues in the interpretation
and application of section 356(a) to the exchange by the shareholder. First, it is unclear what standards should be used to determine if the exchange has the effect of the distribution of a
dividend under section 356(a)(2). A related issue is which corporation's earnings and profits-those of the transferor corporation,
the acquiring corporation, or both-operate as the limit on the
amount of boot which will be treated as a dividend.5 A third issue
arises in reorganizations where the section 356 limitation of taxable income to the amount of realized gain seems particularly inappropriate. This occurs when the same shareholders control
both corporations prior to the reorganization.6 In these situations,
the issue is whether the total amount of boot distributed should be
2. It is assumed that the shareholder did not own any notes or bonds of the transferor
corporation that qualified as securities. If he or she did, the exchange would still qualify
under I.R.C. § 354(a) so long as the shareholder received securities of the acquiring corporation with a principal amount no larger than that of the securities surrendered.
3. For example, if a shareholder's basis in stock of the transferor corporation was
$150 and the reorganization resulted in the shareholder's receiving boot and stock worth
$200, an amount of income equal to the lesser of the amount of boot or $50 would be
recognized. The amount of boot would be the sum of money and fair market value of any
property other than stock of the acquiring corporation received in the reorganization.
4. A shareholder receiving only cash or other nonqualifying property as consideration in a reorganization will be taxed under § 302 rather than § 356. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.354-1(d) Ex. 3 (1979); Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; I.R.C. § 302. Section 356 is
applicable only if there is an exchange that would qualify under § 354 except that nonqualifying property is also present.
5. The status of the earnings and profits account does not determine whether the
exchange has the effect of the distribution of a dividend. Rather, once that effect has been
found, the amount of earnings and profits determines how much of the recognized gain will
be treated as a dividend. See Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(b) (1955). See also I.R.C. § 302(b)(1);
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1955).
6. The transaction is then similar to a sale by shareholders of their stock in one corporation to another corporation when the selling shareholders controlled both corporations. Under appropriate circumstances the sales proceeds are treated as a distribution by
an ongoing corporation and are taxed as ordinary income if there are sufficient earnings
and profits. I.R.C. § 304. See Kempf, Section 304 of the Internal Revenue Code.- Unmasking DisguisedDividends in Related CorporationTransactions, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 60
(1965).
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taxed as a dividend under Code sections 301 and 316, rather than
only having the gain included in income under section 356.
The proper resolution of these issues can be critically important to shareholders. The tax treatment of any boot can affect
such matters as how the transaction should be structured and even
whether the transactions should qualify as a reorganization.7 Because of the complexity of these issues, their proper resolution requires careful analysis of the nature of reorganizations and of the
basic principles governing the taxation of corporate distributions.
This Article will focus on the taxation of boot in reorganizations involving the combination of two or more corporations-amalgamating reorganizations4--and will offer resolutions
of the questions raised by the three issues presented above. The
Article concludes that, for purposes of interpreting section 356, the
distribution of boot should be viewed as a substitute for a distribution by the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization.
Therefore, whether the exchange has the "effect of the distribution
of a dividend" should be determined by an application of the
principles of sections 302 and 346 of the Code to a hypothetical
distribution of the boot by the transferor corporation prior to the
reorganization. Similarly, the amount taxed as a dividend should
be limited by the shareholder's ratable share of the earnings and
profits of the transferor corporation. These conclusions will not
be applicable, however, when the corporations had identical ownership prior to the reorganization and there was a pro rata distribution of boot to the shareholders. In such cases the boot should
be taxed as a distribution by an ongoing corporation under section
301 of the Code, rather than being taxed under section 356.
Sections I and II furnish some necessary background, discuss7. For example, an individual shareholder may have gain on an exchange of stock
that is less than the amount of boot received. Here, the shareholder will typically be better
off when the transaction does not qualify as a reorganization than when the transaction is a
reorganization and the boot is taxed at ordinary income rates.
8. The Article does not directly discuss distributions of cash or other nonqualifying
property in other types of reorganizations. The other types of reorganizations would be
divisive reorganizations under §§ 368(a)(l)(D) & 355 of the Code, and reorganizations involving a transformation of a single corporation such as a recapitalization under
§ 368(a)(l)(E). When there is a combination of two corporations qualifying as a reorganization and one of the corporations was merely a shell prior to the combination, the reorganization would not for purposes of this Article be considered an amalgamating
reorganization.
The Article also does not discuss the situation when the shareholder's stock in the transferor corporation is section 306 stock. See I.R.C. § 356(e).
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ing the consequences of boot in amalgamating reorganizations
and providing a detailed introduction to section 356. Section III
explores the role of Code sections 302 and 346 when deciding
upon the criteria to be used in determining whether an exchange
has the effect of the distribution of a dividend under section
356(a)(2). Sections IV and V discuss the proper resolution of the
three issues presented above. Section IV focuses on amalgamating
reorganizations where the corporations had no common shareholders prior to the reorganization, while section V discusses situations where the corporations had some common shareholders.
The Article concludes by suggesting certain amendments to section 356.
I.

THE ROLE OF BOOT IN AMALGAMATING REORGANIZATIONS

If a combination of two or more corporations qualifies as a
reorganization, gain or loss will usually not be recognized by the
corporations 9 or by shareholders who only receive stock of the acquiring corporation.' 0 The tax attributes of the corporations involved in the combination, such as earnings and profits or net
operating loss carryovers, will generally survive the reorganization."I Furthermore, the acquiring corporation will assume a carryover basis for the. transferred assets.' 2 Thus, the corporate
existence of the transferor corporation is, in a sense, continued in
the acquiring corporation.
If boot is distributed in the reorganization, it will have only a
limited effect on these tax consequences. The distributees of boot
will recognize gain to the extent that they receive boot,' 3 and the
earnings and profits account of the transferor corporation will be
affected by the distribution.' 4 These effects are similar to the consequences of a distribution of property by an ongoing corporation
to its shareholders. On the other hand, the transferor corporation
will generally still not recognize any gain or loss in the reorganization'5 and the acquiring corporation will still have a carryover ba9. I.R.C. §§ 361(a), 1032. The transferor corporation will recognize gain to the extent it receives boot and does not distribute the boot to its shareholders. I.R.C. § 361(b).
10. Id. § 354. For the tax consequences if securities are received, see note 2 supra.
11. I.R.C. § 381.
12. Id § 362(b).
13. Id § 356.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(2)-1(c)(1) (1961).
15. I.R.C. § 361. If the transferor corporation receives boot and does not distribute
the boot to its shareholders, then it will recognize gain to the extent of the boot.
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sis for the transferred assets. 1 6 The carryover of corporate
attributes other than earnings and profits will also not be affected
by the boot. 7 Therefore, the presence of boot will not cause the
transaction to be viewed as part reorganization and part taxable
exchange of stock for the boot. The transaction is viewed instead
as a reorganization with a distribution by the corporations to their
shareholders. The distribution of an excessive amount of boot,
however, can have a great effect on the tax consequences. Too
much boot will cause the transaction to be treated as a taxable
exchange and not as a qualified reorganization.'
A.

Continuity of ShareholderInterest

The shareholders of the transferor corporation in an amalgamating reorganization are not viewed as liquidating their interest
in the corporation; rather they continue their interest in it through
ownership of the acquiring corporation.
The underlying assumption of these exceptions [to recognition
of the gain or loss under present section 1001(c)] is that the new
property is substantially a continuation of the old investment
still unliquidated; and, in the case of reorganizations, that the
new enterprise, the new corporate structure and the new property are substantially continuations of the old still unliquidated.19

It is therefore crucial to the concept of a reorganization that the
shareholders of the transferor corporation retain a substantial in16. Id. § 362(b). If the transferor corporation recognizes gain on the exchange (see
note 15 supra), the basis to the acquiring corporation will be increased by the amount of
such recognized gain.
17. I.R.C. § 381.
18. See notes 19-37 infra and accompanying text.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1957). Note, however, that I.R.C. § 1002 has been repealed and replaced by I.R.C. § 1001(c). See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 740
(1947).
Congress has never definitively stated its reasons for the nonrecognition of the gain or
loss realized in reorganizations. Two separate justifications for the tax treatment of reorganizations can be gleaned from the legislative history. First, exchanges which take place
in connection with a reorganization are "changes in form and not in substance." H.R. REP.
No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1924). Accord, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
17-18 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954). Second, gain should not be recognized on exchanges taking
place pursuant to reorganizations so that ordinary business transactions are not prevented.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1924). Accord, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14-15 (1924). Compare Cohen, ConglomerateMergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A.J.
40 (1969), and Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, andRealism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1957) with
Turnier, Continuiy of Interest-Its Application to Shareholdersof the Acquiring Corporation, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 902, 912-16 (1976).
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terest in that corporation by obtaining an interest in the acquiring
corporation. 20 This continuity of shareholder interest requirement
limits the amount of boot that can be distributed in a reorganization; shareholders of the transferor corporation will not retain the
requisite continuity of interest if they receive excessive boot.
The doctrine of continuity of shareholder interest originated in
Judge Augustus Hand's opinion in Cortland Specialty Co. v.
UnitedStates 2 I and in the Supreme Court's opinion in PinellasIce
& Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner.21 In both cases a corporation transferred substantially all its assets to another corporation
for cash and short-term notes which were then distributed to its
shareholders. Although nothing in the statutory definition of a
reorganization referred to the consideration received by the transferor corporation or its shareholders, 23 the courts in each case concluded that the corporation or its shareholders must obtain a more
definite interest in the acquiring corporation for the transaction to
qualify as a reorganization.24 Judge Hand in CortlandSpecialty
concluded:
In defining "reorganization," section 203 of the Revenue Act
...does not abandon the primary requisite that there must be
some continuity of interest on the part of the transferor corporation or its shareholders in order to secure exemption. Reorganization presupposes continuance of business under modified
corporate form.pb
In 1934 Congress enacted a statutory continuity of shareholder
interest requirement in stock-for-stock and stock-for-asset
reorganizations. 26 This statutory requirement was severe, since it
did not allow the distribution of any consideration other than vot20. There is also the judicial doctrine of continuity of business enterprise. For a discussion of this doctrine, see B. B1TTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 14.51 at 14-129 to 14-130 (4th ed. 1979).

21. 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
22. 287 U.S. 462 (1933). See also the lower court decision in Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1932).
23. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(h)(1), 44 Stat. 14.
24. In both CortlandSpecialty and Pinellas the conclusion that continuity of shareholder interest in the acquiring corporation is a requirement for a transaction to qualify as
a reorganization was not the only ground for the decision. Both courts also concluded that
the short-term notes were not "securities." Therefore, the shareholders had not received
property that would qualify for nonrecognition under § 203(e) of the Revenue Act of 1926,
the predecessor of § 354 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, even if the transaction had
qualified as a reorganization. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(e), 44 Stat. 14.
25. 60 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
26. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § I 12(g), 48 Stat. 705. The reorganizations affected
correspond to reorganizations defined by I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B)-(C).
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ing stock of the acquiring corporation. Although liberalized
somewhat since 1934, the statutory continuity of interest test continues to be quite strict for both types of reorganizations.2 7 Because cases that were governed by the pre-1934 law continued to
arise and because not all reorganizations were subject to the statutory continuity of interest test, the courts continued to develop a
judicial continuity of interest test. The standard that evolved for
the judicial test requires that a "substantial" portion of the total
consideration received by all the shareholders in the reorganiza-

tion must be in the form of an equity interest in the acquiring
corporation. 28 What constitutes a "substantial" portion is unclear,
although a one-half interest in the acquiring corporation would
clearly qualify.29 Under the present Internal Revenue Code, the
statutory and judicial doctrines of continuity of shareholder inter-

est coexist.
B.

Types of Reorganizationsand Distributionof Boot

If boot will be distributed in a combination of two or more
corporations and classification as a reorganization is desired, the
27. Congress has liberalized the statutory continuity of interest requirement for "B"
and "C" reorganizations in several respects. One aspect concerns "remote continuity of
interest." Stock of the parent of the acquiring corporation can now satisfy the statutory
continuity of interest test. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B)-(C). Similarly assets or stock of the acquired corporation can be transferred by the acquiring corporation to a subsidiary without
destroying continuity of interest. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C). (Analogous rules apply to statutory mergers and consolidations. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(C)-(E).) For a thorough discussion of
these provisions and an account of how they changed the law, see Ferguson & Ginsburg,
Triangular Reorganizations, 28 TAx. L. REV. 159 (1973).
In "C" reorganizations, assumptions of debt will generally not be treated as nonqualifying consideration for continuity of interest purposes. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). A limited
amount of consideration other than voting stock and assumption of debt can be used in a
"C" reorganization, but assumption of debt is then treated as nonqualifying consideration.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(B). See note 32 infra.
28. This standard was developed in a series of Supreme Court decisions. John A.
Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S.
378 (1935); Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (1935); LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415
(1940). Thorough discussions of this development can be found in Brookes, The Continuity
of Interest Test in Reorganizations-A Blessing or a Curse, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1946), and
Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest", 58 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1945).
29. In John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935), continuity of interest was
satisfied where approximately 38% of the total consideration in the reorganization was
stock (valuing the preferred stock at par value) and 62% was cash.
The Internal Revenue Service will issue a ruling that a transaction qualifies as a reorganization only if at least 50% of the consideration is stock of the acquiring corporation or
its parent. The test is applied with respect to total consideration received by all shareholders, not with respect to each shareholder individually. Rev. P. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. See
also Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 C.B. 114.
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transaction will often be cast in the form of a statutory merger or

consolidation, so as to qualify as a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(A) of the Code ("A" reorganization). Only the judicial
doctrine of continuity of interest is applicable to an "A" reorgani-

zation. Consequently, shareholders of the transferor corporation
can receive at least half their consideration in a form other than
stock of the acquiring corporation. 30 Boot can also be distributed
in a reorganization involving a merger of a corporation with a
controlled subsidiary of the corporation whose stock is distributed
as consideration, but there may be statutory limits on the amount
of boot that can be used. 3 1 The statutory continuity of interest

requirement precludes the use of boot in a reorganization involving a stock-for-stock exchange under section 368(a)(1)(B) ("B" reorganization) and severely restricts the use of boot in a
reorganization involving a stock-for-assets exchange under section
368(a)(1)(C) ("C" reorganization).32 In the discussion below it
will often be assumed that the reorganization is in the form of a
statutory merger or consolidation. Nevertheless, the conclusions
arrived at will generally be valid for other types of reorganizations
in which boot can be distributed.
30. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
31. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D)-(E). In a "triangular" merger under § 368(a)(2)(D), stock of
the parent of the acquiring corporation can be distributed in exchange for stock of the
transferor corporation. The transferor corporation must transfer, by means of the merger,
substantially all of its properties to the acquiring corporation. The only statutory restriction on the type of consideration that can be used is the prohibition against using any stock
of the acquiring corporation. The judicial doctrine of continuity of interest applies, with
the stock of the acquiring corporation's parent "carrying" the necessary continuity. Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2) (1973).
In a "reverse triangular merger" under § 368(a)(2)(E), voting stock of the parent of the
merged or acquired corporation can be exchanged for stock of the surviving or acquiring
corporation if the surviving corporation, immediately after the reorganization, holds substantially all of its properties and substantially all of the properties of the merged corporation. Former shareholders of the surviving corporation must exchange an amount of stock
constituting control (as defined in § 368(c), note 33 infra) in that corporation for voting
stock of the parent of the merged corporation. This statutory continuity of interest requirement is much stricter than the judicial doctrine.
32. Sections 368(a)(1)(B) and 368(a)(I)(C) allow only voting stock of the acquiring
corporation or of the parent of the acquiring corporation to be used. For "C" reorganizations, however, § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii) mitigates this requirement allowing boot to be used if at
least 80% of the fair market value of all properties of the transferor corporation is acquired
for voting stock. For the purpose of determining whether this clause applies, the amount of
any liability which is assumed by the acquiring corporation, or to which property transferred to the acquiring corporation is subject, will be treated as money paid for the property. Therefore, if liabilities transferred to the acquiring corporation exceed 20% of the
value of the assets of the transferor corporation, boot cannot be used in a "C" reorganization.
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In very limited situations, two or more corporations can combine in a transaction qualifying as a reorganization under sections
368(a)(1)(D) and 354(b) of the Code (a nondivisive "D" reorganization). For the transaction to qualify as a nondivisive "D" reorganization, the transferor corporation, its shareholders, or both,
must be in control of the acquiring corporation immediately after
the transaction. 33 Because of the control requirement continuity
of shareholder interest is generally not an issue in "D" reorganizations, and there are no limitations on the amount of boot that can
be distributed.3 4 A combination of two or more corporations can
also qualify as a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(F) ("F"

reorganization), 35 but any combination qualifying as an "F" reorganization would also qualify as a "D" reorganization.3 6 Classification as an "F" 3reorganization
may, however, arguably affect the
7
boot.
of
taxation
II.

SECTION

356

Subsections (a) and (c) of section 356 contain the basic rules
governing the taxation of boot distributed in reorganizations.
They provide for the same tax treatment as did subsections (d)
33. "Control" is defined in the Code as "the ownership of stock possessing at least 80
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." I.R.C. § 368(c).
34. In other respects, however, continuity of shareholder interest could be an issue.
For example, if the former shareholders of the transferor corporation sold their stock in the
acquiring corporation immediately after the reorganization as part of a pre-arranged plan,
such continuity of shareholder interest would probably be violated. See B. BITTKER & J.
EusTicE, supra note 20, § 14.11 at 14-24 to 25.
35. See Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129, and cases cited therein. See also Rev.
Rul. 78-287, 1978-2 C.B. 146. But see Berger Machine Products, Inc. 68 T.C. 358, 363-65
(1977). Section 368(a)(1)(F) defines a "reorganization" as consisting of "a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization, however effectad."
36. See Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1971); Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Estate of Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420 (1970), aj'd on other
grounds, 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972); Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
37. The Fifth Circuit in an alternative holding has stated that boot distributed in an
"F" reorganization should be taxed under § 301 as a distribution by an ongoing corporation rather than under § 356. Davant v. United States, 366 F.2d 874, 890 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967). See notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text.
The issue of whether a "D" reorganization is also an "F' reorganization usually arises
when an acquiring corporation seeks to carry back the losses of the transferor corporation
from a post-acquisition year to a pre-acquisition year. I.R.C. § 381(b). See, e.g., Estate of
Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968); Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967) (validity of notice of deficiency affected
by whether the transaction qualified as an "F' reorganization).
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and (f) of section 203 of the Revenue Act of 1924.38 Various attempts have been made to modify these provisions, but none has
been successful.3 9
38. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d) & (f), 43 Stat. 253.
The earliest identifiable predecessor of§ 356 is § 202(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 202(e), 42 Stat. 227. Section 202(e) applied to nonqualifying property or boot received in like-kind exchanges and in exchanges with controlled corporations (exchanges in
which gain or loss would not be recognized if no boot were distributed) as well as to boot
received by owners of stock or securities in reorganizations. If boot were distributed in any
of these exchanges, no gain would be recognized until the value of the boot exceeded the
basis of the property given up in the exchange. The boot would first reduce the basis of the
property received in the exchange. In 1923, § 202(e) was amended to provide that the
distributee of boot would recognize any gain realized, but not in excess of the amount of
boot received in the exchange. Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 294, § 2, 42 Stat. 1560. Present
§ 356(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code contains the same rule.
In the Revenue Act of 1924 §§ 203(d) and 203(f) provided for the taxation of boot.
Section 203(d)(1), which again applied to boot received in several types of nonrecognition
exchanges, adopted the same tax treatment of boot which had been established by
amended § 202(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921. Section 203(d)(2), which was a new provision in 1924, applied only to boot distributed to owners of stock or securities in a reorganization. It provided that, if the distribution of boot had the effect of the distribution of a
taxable dividend, then the distributee's gain would be "taxed as a dividend" to the extent of
the distributee's "ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation
accumulated after February 28, 1913." Present § 356(a)(2) of the Code is almost identical
to former § 203(d)(2). Section 203(f) of the Revenue Act of 1924, which was also new,
provided that persons who received boot in several types of nonrecognition exchanges,
including reorganizations, could not recognize any loss realized in the exchange. Present
§ 356(c) of the Code contains this provision for distributees of boot in reorganizations.
39. In particular, the House of Representatives, in the bill that was eventually to become the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, provided for significantly different tax treatment
of boot. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954). The House bill provided that boot
distributions which were "not substantially disproportionate" would be taxed in a manner
similar to any corporate distribution with respect to stock. The dividend within gain limitation was removed. Whether a boot distribution was substantially disproportionate would
be determined by applying the rules for redemptions by ongoing corporations to the shareholders of the transferor corporation. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A85-A86. These changes were, however, rejected by the Senate, and the House subsequently agreed with this decision. See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954).
For other attempts to change § 356, see H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., IstSess. § 21 (1959)
(revised amendments of Advisory Group on Subchapter C of Internal Revenue Code of
1954); Subchapter C Advisory Group Report on CorporateDistributionsandAdjustments to
Accompany Subchapter C Advisory Group ProposedAmendments, Hearings on Topics Pertaining to the GeneralRevision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Comm.on
Ways andMeans, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 at 2549 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Subchapter
C Report] Revised Report on CorporateDistributionsandAdjustments to Accompany Subchapter C Advisory Group ProposedAmendments as Revised, Hearingson Advisory Group
Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 554 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Subchapter CRevisedReport];AMERICAN LAW INSTITUtE FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX PROJECT, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, REPORT OF WORKING VIEWS OF STUDY BY THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND STAFF AND
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION LIAISON COMMITTEE 308-14 (1958).

1980]

NONQ UALIFYING PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS

This section of the Article sets out the basic provisions of Code
section 356 and compares the taxation of distributions of boot in a
reorganization to distributions of property by ongoing corporations. Under either section 302 or 346, a distribution by an ongoing corporation might be found to be "not essentially equivalent
to a dividend."4 Hence, the standards developed under these sections will aid in determining whether a distribution of boot has the
effect of a dividend within the meaning of section 356(a)(2). It
must be noted, however, that substantial differences exist between
taxation of property distributed by ongoing corporations and the
taxation of boot distributed in reorganizations. Therefore, rules
from section 302 or 346 cannot mechanically be transferred to section 356.
Gain Limitation. Section 356(a) provides that boot received in
a reorganization will be taxed only to the extent of gain. If a distribution of boot has the effect of a dividend and is made from the
distributee's share of accumulated earnings and profits, the boot
will be treated as a dividend only to the extent of gain. The dividend within gain limitation is, at the very least, anomalous and is
significantly different from the tax treatment accorded distributions by ongoing corporations. A shareholder of an ongoing corporation who receives a dividend, or who receives a distribution in
as a dividend, must include the
redemption of stock that is taxed
41
total distribution in income.
The dividend within gain limitation may have been a drafting
error when Congress passed section 203(d)(2) of the Revenue Act
of 1924.42 The Committee Reports to the Revenue Act of 1924
seem to indicate that the effect of the gain limitation was not understood. 43 However, in enacting the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, Congress seemingly made a conscious decision to retain the
limitation. The House of Representatives had provided that a dis40. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(1), 346(a)(2).
41. Id §§ 301(c), 302(d).
42. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 203(d), (f), 43 Stat. 253. See Shoulson, Boot
Taxatlon." The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REv. 573, 578-79 (1965).
43. In an attempt to explain § 203(d)(2), the House and Senate Reports contained the
example of a corporation with earnings and profits of $50,000 that transfers its assets to a
newly formed corporation with the same ownership and distributes $50,000 as boot in the
reorganization. The Reports equated the effect of the distribution of $50,000 with the declaration of a dividend and concluded that the distribution should be subject to the full tax
applicable to dividends. However, § 203(d)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1924 (as well as present § 356(a)(2)) taxed boot only to the extent of gain. Therefore, some or all the boot in the
example could escape the tax applicable to dividends. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14-15 (1924); S.REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1924).
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tribution of boot that was not "substantially disproportionate"
would be fully taxed as a dividend to the extent of earnings and
profits.' The Senate, rejecting the House's approach, reinstated
the dividend within gain limitation.45 The House subsequently
concurred.46
The computation of gain when boot is distributed in a reorganization will not be analogous to the computation when there is
a partial liquidation or a redemption treated as an exchange.
When boot is distributed, gain is generally computed on the entire
exchange; particular shares of the transferor corporation are not

exchanged for

boot.47

In a redemption or partial liquidation, par-

ticular shares are exchanged for cash or other property, and gain
is computed accordingly.
44. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954). See also H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 21 (1959).
45. As the Senate Report noted:
Under the House bill, if the distribution is otherwise to be taxed as a dividend, it
will be taxed as such regardless of whether the shareholder had a gain on the
transaction as a whole. Your committee returns to existing law in taxing a dividend only to the extent of the amount of "boot" received which is not in excess of
the particular shareholder's gain.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954). In enacting § 356(b) of the Code in 1954,
Congress provided that the dividend within gain limitation should not apply when there is
a distribution of boot in an otherwise tax-free pro rata distribution of stock under § 355.
Such a provision is further evidence that retention of the dividend within gain limitation
for distributions of boot in other transactions was not an oversight. See also I.R.C.
§ 356(e). However, Norris Darrell in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee commented that there were no particular objections to the treatment of boot in H.R.
8300 but that it "fell by the wayside" because of the objections to other portions of Subchapter C in the House bill. Hearings on Topics Pertainingto the GeneralRevision of the
InternalRevenue Code Before the House Comm on Ways andMeans, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 3 at 2602 (statement of Norris Darrell). The haste with which the House bill was rewritten supports the view that the rejection of the provisions governing boot in the House bill
did not necessarily reflect considered opposition to the approach. See Darrell, Internal
Revenue Code of 1954-A Striking Example ofthe Legislative Processin Action, 1955 U. S.
CAL. TAX INST. I.
46. H.R. REP.No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954).
47. The Internal Revenue Service feels that the shareholder generally receives a proportionate amount of stock of the acquiring corporation and boot for each share of the
same class in the transferor corporation. See Rev. Rul. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 144. If the
shareholder had the same basis in each of the shares surrendered in the exchange, the gain
recognized pursuant to § 356(a) would be limited by the shareholder's gain on the whole
transaction. However, if the shareholder had different bases for different shares, there
could be gain on some shares and losses on others; the shareholder could not offset the gain
on some shares with losses on others. Id. In H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., IstSess. § 21 (1959)
gain would be computed by comparing a portion of the basis of the stock exchanged in the
reorganization with the amount of boot. The relevant portion of the basis would be that
fraction equal to the boot received, divided by total consideration received in the reorganization.
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Earnings and Profits. Section 356(a)(2) provides that a distribution of boot can be taxed as a dividend only to the extent that it
does not exceed the distributee's ratable share of accumulated

earnings and profits. In contrast, the amount of dividend income
resulting from a distribution by an ongoing corporation will be

limited only by the total amount of both current and accumulated
earnings and profits.4 8
It has been suggested that the limitation of ordinary income to
the distributee's ratable share of earnings and profits provided by
section 356(a)(2) follows directly from the dividend within gain
limitation.4 9 It is argued that without the limitation of ordinary
income to the distributee's ratable share of earnings and profits,

the amount of ordinary income recognized by a distributee would
depend on the amount of gain realized by other distributees of

boot. This position assumes that earnings and profits will be reduced only by the amount of gain recognized by a distributee of

boot.

50

48. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316. It is interesting to note that § 333(e) of the Code, which applies
to proceeds received in certain types of corporate liquidations, has a rule similar to that of
§ 356(a)(2). See also I.R.C. §§ 1246, 1248.
A court could hold that the language of§ 356(a)(2) should not be taken literally and the
distributee of boot should have ordinary income to the extent of the ratable share of current or accumulated earnings and profits. See Vesper Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 200,
205 (8th Cir. 1942); W.H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067, 1083-84 (1956). Both cases interpreted the
phrase "distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913" in § 115(g)
of the 1939 Code, which is the predecessor of current § 302(d), to include current and
accumulated earnings and profits. According to the courts, this phrase only emphasized
that earnings and profits accumulated prior to February 28, 1913 are excluded. This issue
is no longer relevant for § 302(d) of the Code, which refers directly to § 301 (and therefore
indirectly to § 316) for qualification as a dividend, but the courts' holdings could be applied
to § 356(a)(2).
In James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964), the Tax Court included earnings and profits
of the year of a distribution with accumulated earnings and profits from previous years in
determining the appropriate amount of a distribution under § 356(a)(2) that should be
taxed as a dividend. This conclusion is clearly correct, for accumulated earnings and profits should include earnings and profits of the current year. A completely separate issue is
raised when there is a deficit in accumulated earnings and profits but a surplus in current
earnings and profits.
49. Shoulson, supra note 42, at 579; Wittenstein, Boot Distributions and Section
112(c)(2): A Re-examination, 8 TAx L. REv. 63, 68 n.14 (1952). However, in the proposed
amendments submitted by the Advisory Group of Subchapter C, the dividend within gain
limitation was removed, while the limitation of the distributee's ratable share of earnings
and profits was retained. H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., IstSess. § 21 (1959).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(2)-l(c)(l) does not help resolve this issue. It provides that
the earnings and profits of the transferor corporation on the date of transfer shall be computed by taking into account the amount of earnings and profits "properly applicable" to
the distribution of boot. The Tax Court in Sidney S. Munter, 5 T.C. 108 (1945), held that
earnings and profits would be reduced by a distribution of boot only to the extent of gain,
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Recognition of Loss. Section 356(c) does not allow the
distributee of boot to recognize any loss on the exchange."' The
investment in any of the shares is not considered to have been
liquidated.5" In contrast, a shareholder who sells stock to the cor-

poration pursuant to a redemption qualifying as an exchange or
pursuant to a partial liquidation can recognize loss even though
an interest in the corporation is retained.53
In Kind Transfer to Corporate Distributees. If property other
than cash is distributed as boot to a corporate shareholder and if
the boot has the effect of a dividend, the corporation will take the
fair market value of the property as its basis 4 and will qualify for
the eighty-five percent dividend received deduction. 5 Therefore,

any previously unrecognized gain on the property will largely escape taxation unless the distributor of the property recognizes gain
on the distribution. If the property originates in the transferor
corporation, gain will probably not be recognized. 6 In contrast, a
corporation that receives a dividend of property other than cash
will carry over the distributor's basis, increased by the amount of
gain recognized to the distributing corporation, so long as this total amount is lower than the fair market value.57
and no decrease in earnings and profits was allowed. Neither the Third Circuit nor the
Supreme Court reached this issue on appeal, but the Supreme Court seemed to indicate
that it agreed with the Tax Court. Munter v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 132 (1946), rev'd, 331
U.S. 210 (1947). But see Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197, where the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that earnings and profits should decline by the total amount of distribution
which has the effect of a dividend, even though the distributee's ratable share of earnings
and profits was less than the amount of boot received. For a good general discussion of
effect of boot on earnings and profits, see Halperin, Carryovers of Earningsand Profits, 18
TAx L. REv. 289, 310-17 (1963).
51. See generally H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1959). In the proposed bill,
the distribution of boot would have allowed some of the realized loss to be recognized if the
boot did not have the effect of a dividend. The amount of boot would be compared with a
portion of the basis of the stock exchanged in the reorganization to determine the amount
of gain or loss. The relevant portion of the basis would be that fraction equal to the boot
received divided by total consideration received in the reorganization.
52. When nonqualifying property is distributed in other exchanges where gain or loss
is generally not recognized, the boot will not cause any realized loss to be recognized. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031(c), 361(b)(2).
53. Id. §§ 302(a), 331(a)(2).
54. Id § 358(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(d) (1955).
55. I.R.C. § 243. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl.
1969); Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197.
56. See I.R.C. § 311(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.311-2(a)(2) (1972). If the property originated
in the acquiring corporation, then the acquiring corporation will recognize gain or loss.
Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197.
57. I.R.C. § 301(d)(2). In general, the distributor of a dividend of property other than

19801

III.

NONQUALIFYING PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS
THE ROLE OF SECTIONS

302

AND

346

IN REPLACING THE

AUTOMATIC DIVIDEND RULE

The basic issue in interpreting section 356 is what criteria
should be used to determine whether the exchange has the effect
of the distribution of a dividend. For many years, controversy
centered around the Internal Revenue Service's position that the
exchange should always have the effect of the distribution of a
dividend." Boot would then be taxed as a dividend to the extent
of gain so long as there were sufficient earnings and profits. 9 This
position, known as the automatic dividend rule, originated in the
Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford. 0
In Estate ofBedford, cash was distributed to shareholders pursuant to a recapitalization.6 ' The Court's holding that the cash
had the effect of a dividend under the predecessor to section 356
was clearly correct. There had been no contraction of the corporate enterprise, and the Estate's relative interest in the corporation
was not shown to have declined. However, the Supreme Court
seemed to say that boot would always be taxed as a dividend so
long as there were sufficient earnings and profits: "[A] distribution, pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits 'has the
effect of a distribution of a taxable dividend' within § 112(c)(2). ' ' 62
The Court reasoned that section 115(i) of the Revenue Act of
1936, which defined "partial liquidation," had no relevance to the
boot provision of section 112(c)(2).6 3
cash does not recognize gain or loss, although there are significant exceptions. See, e.g., id.
§§ 311(b), (c), 1245, 1250.
58. See Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191; Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d
747, 750 (2d Cir. 1956). The Internal Revenue Service would, however, argue against this
position in particular cases when it was to its advantage. See Idaho Power Co. v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
59. See note 5, supra.
60. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
61. The Estate of Edward T. Bedford owned 3,000 shares of 7% cumulative preferred
stock in the Abercrombie and Fitch Company. The corporation adopted a plan of recapitalization to effect a reduction of capital and remove from its books a surplus book deficit,
which under state law prevented it from paying dividends. The Estate exchanged its preferred stock for 3,500 shares of $6 cumulative preferred stock, 1,500 shares of common
stock, and $45,240 in cash pursuant to the plan of reorganization.
62. 325 U.S. at 292.
63. The Court said:
[Tjhe classifications of § 115 ... do not apply to a situation arising within § 112.
The definition of a "partial liquidation" in § 115(i) is specifically limited to use in
§ 115. To attempt to carry it over to § 112 would distort its purpose. That limitation is not true of § 115(a) which defines "dividend" for the purpose of the whole
title. Accordingly, this definition is infused into § I12(c)(2). Under § 115(a) a
distribution out of accumulated earnings and profits is a "dividend," thus con-
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The automatic dividend rule was not well received by the
courts,' and in 1974 the Internal Revenue Service formally abandoned it.6 5 Until 1974, much effort was expended attacking the

automatic rule, but comparatively little attention was devoted to
considering an appropriate alternative.6 6 It seemed clear, however, that the courts should refer in some fashion to the principles
of sections 302 and 346 of the Code for guidance.6 7
A.

Guidancefrom Section 346

Under section 346 of the Internal Revenue Code and the Regulations a distribution from a corporation to its shareholders will
be in partial liquidation of the corporation if the distribution refirming the conclusion that a distribution of earnings and profits has the "effect of
the distribution of a taxable dividend" under § 112(c)(2).
Id at 291-92.
64. In several cases the validity of the automatic dividend rule was questioned, but the
courts considered it unnecessary to rule on the issue of validity because they found the
distributions had the effect of a dividend even without the automatic dividend rule. See
Hawkinson v. United States, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
646 (1st Cir. 1949); King Ent., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. CI. 1969); Ross v.
United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), ceri. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334, 349 (1966).
The first case in which the automatic dividend rule was explicitly rejected was Idaho
Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
Ironically, the Government argued against the automatic dividend test and won the case.
See also Bateman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 408 (1962), in which Commissioner v. Estateof
Bedford was distinguished.
The government suffered its first clear defeat on the automatic dividend rule before the
district court in Wright v. United States, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aft'd,
482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). The Internal Revenue Service did not argue the automatic
dividend rule in the appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
65. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118. See also Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
66. See Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford's Estate, 24 TAXES 267 (1946);
Gerson, Boot Dividends and the Automatic Rule: Bedford Revisited, 11 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 841 (1970); Moore, Taxation of DistributionsMade in Connection with a Corporate
Reorganization, 17 TAX. L. REV. 129 (1961); Shoulson, supra note 42; Wittenstein, supra
note 49; note 64 supra. To the extent that courts considered an alternative, they treated the
boot as being distributed by the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization and
characterized the boot accordingly. See note 90 infra.
67. See Moore, supra note 66; Shoulson, supra note 42.
In a recent article the position is taken that, in reorganizations where the corporations
had not been commonly controlled, the principles of § 302 and § 346 should not be applied
in determining whether boot has the effect of a dividend. In such reorganizations, it is
argued, the boot should never be taxed under § 356(a)(2). Golub, "'Boot"in Reorganizations-The Dividend Equivalency Test of Section 356(a)(2), 58 TAXES 904 (1980). One of
the problems with this argument is that the major function of § 356(a)(2) then is to tax boot
in reorganizations involving commonly controlled corporations and in recapitalizations.
The dividend within gain limitation of § 356(a)(2) makes no sense in such situations since
there is no real exchange taking place. See note 6 supra.
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suits from a bona fide contraction of the corporation. 68 A shareholder who receives a portion of such a distribution is treated as
exchanging an appropriate amount of stock and will normally realize capital gain or loss.69 Since there has been a major adjustment in the business of the corporation, distributions emanating
from such an adjustment are not regarded as equivalent to a dividend.
Section 346 is relevant in interpreting the phrase "effect of the
distribution of a dividend" found in section 356(a)(2), but only in
very limited circumstances. A corporation may distribute assets of
a business to its shareholders immediately prior to a merger with a
second corporation. Alternatively, as part of the reorganization
plan, the corporation could sell the assets to an unrelated third
party, and the shareholders of the transferor corporation would
receive the proceeds from the sale, as well as stock of the acquiring corporation. If the distribution of assets or proceeds would
have qualified as a distribution in partial liquidation absent the
reorganization, it follows that the distribution would not have the
effect of a dividend when it took place simultaneously with a reorganization.70 The subsequent reorganization would not cause the
distribution to appear more like a dividend distribution.
On the other hand, the boot may emanate from contraction of
the acquiring, rather than the transferor, corporation. Although
the distribution of assets to the shareholders of the acquiring corporation might qualify as a partial liquidation, this result should
not affect the determination of whether the boot distributed to the
transferor corporation's shareholders has the effect of a dividend.
The assets (or the proceeds from sale of the assets) are not being
distributed to shareholders of the corporation that carried on the
business. The distribution of boot in this instance is not similar to
a distribution in partial liquidation.
B.

Guidancefrom Section 302

Section 302(a) of the Internal Revenue Code treats distributions in redemption of stock as payment in exchange for the stock
when the distribution meets any of the requirements of section
68. I.R.C. § 346; Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1 (1955). For a discussion of the requirements of
a partial liquidation, see B. BrrrKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 20, at §§ 9.52-9.53.
69. I.R.C. § 331.
70. See H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 21 (1959). Butsee H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 306 (1954) (characterization of boot did not depend at all on whether the distribution of boot could qualify as a partial liquidation).
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302(b).7" The distribution would generally then give rise to capi-

tal gain or loss. Otherwise, the distribution falls under section 301
and therefore is treated as a dividend to the extent of earnings and
profits.72
In order for a distribution in redemption of stock to qualify
under section 302(a), the shareholder must usually give up a significant interest in the corporation.73 One or more of the three
attributes of a shareholder's interest ii a corporation-voting
rights, rights to a share of dividend distributions, and rights to a
share of liquidation proceeds-must be reduced for the redemption to qualify under section 302(a).74 The redemption would
then be analogous to a sale from the point of view of the shareholder because a relative interest in the corporation is being exchanged for cash or other property. On the other hand, a
distribution in redemption of stock which does not result in the
shareholder giving up a significant ownership interest is analogous
to a dividend. 75 For example, a pro rata redemption leaves all the
shareholders with the same proportionate interest in the corporation, and it is taxed as a dividend if there are sufficient earnings
and profits.
Section 302 determines the tax effects of redemptions according to whether they are more like sales or dividends. This section
does not, however, give much direct guidance for determining
when a boot distribution in an amalgamating reorganization
should have the effect of a dividend. The shareholder of the trans71. Section 302(b) provides three separate situations in which a redemption can qualify as an exchange under § 302(a). Section 302(b)(1) is a general test which states that the
redemption must not be "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Sections 302(b)(2) and (3)
are safe harbors. Section 302(b)(3) provides for exchange treatment if the redemption is in
"complete redemption of all stock owned by the shareholder." Section 302(b)(2) provides
for exchange treatment if the distribution is "substantially disproportionate with respect to
the shareholder" and "if the shareholder owns less than 50% of the total combined voting
power" in the corporation immediately after the redemption. The distribution will be substantially disproportionate if the shareholder's interest in the corporation is reduced by a
sufficient amount so that the numerical test in § 302(b)(2) is satisfied. Section 318, which
provides for constructive ownership of stock, is generally applicable to § 302, but family
attribution can be waived in certain cases for complete redemptions.
72. I.R.C. § 302(d).
73. The safe harbor provision of § 302(b)(2) requires the shareholder to give up
enough voting power to satisfy a numerical test. Section 302(b)(3) requires the shareholder
to give up all stock interest. For a redemption to qualify under § 302(b)(1), there must be a
"meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation." Davis v. United States, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
74. See Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964).
75. I.R.C. § 302(d).
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feror corporation is receiving boot as part of a transaction in
which shares in the transferor corporation are being exchanged
for shares in the acquiring corporation plus boot. From this perspective, the transaction is always analogous to a sale or exchange.
On the other hand, a pro rata redemption is an exchange only in a
formal, nonsubstantive way.
It is not clear how the principles of section 302 should be used
to interpret section 356(a)(2). Changes in relative ownership are
taking place while the corporations are combining. Even if the
boot can be traced to one of the corporations, it should not necessarily be treated as emanating from the assets of that corporation
for the purpose of applying section 302. The two corporations are
combining into one entity as part of the reorganization; therefore,
determining which corporation is the source of the boot has no
economic significance.76
Because redemptions involve a distribution of assets from a
corporation to its shareholders, Congress could have chosen not to
treat any redemptions as sales to the corporation. 77 An examination of the congressional motivation for treating a redemption that
reduces a shareholder's interest in the corporation as an exchange
of stock by the shareholder provides little guidance for interpreting section 356. In the words of one commentator, the motivation
is "notoriously uncertain." 78 A commonly suggested theory is that
Congress wanted to provide an opportunity for shareholders of
closely held corporations to sell their stock for capital gain, and
that the only potential purchaser normally would be the corporation.79 Although provision for this market may have been the un76. The conclusion that § 302 is not, without further analysis, directly helpful in interpreting § 356(a)(2), even when the boot can be traced to the assets of the transferor corporation, contrasts with the opposite conclusion reached above for § 346. See text
accompanying note 70 supra. The liquidation of a discrete business activity, which is the
essence of a partial liquidation under § 346, retains significance when the remaining corporate activities are transferred to another corporation. On the other hand, the change in
ownership of the transferor corporation, which is measured by § 302, has no inherent significance when the shareholder interests are, in any event, being radically changed by the
reorganization.
77. See Chirelstein, OptionalRedemptions and Optional Dividends.- Taxing the Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J.739 (1969). For example, the tax consequences of a
redemption could be determined as if there had been a pro rata distribution by the corporation followed by constructive sales of stock among the shareholders.
78. Bacon, Share Redemptions by Publicly Held Coimpanies, 26 TAX. L. REv. 283, 300
(1971).
79. See Chirelstein, supra note 77, at 740; Hobbett, The New Attack on Stock Redemptions, 35 TAxEs 830, 838-39 (1957); Pedrick, Some Latter Day Developments in the Taxation
o/LiquidatingDistributions, 50 MICH. L. REV. 529, 530 (1952).
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derlying objective, section 302 is not, in letter or spirit, limited to
distributions by closely held corporations. 80
IV.

COMBINATIONS OF CORPORATIONS THAT Do NOT HAVE
COMMON OWNERSHIP

This section examines the taxation of boot distributed in "acquisitive reorganizations"-transactions in which the shareholders
of the transferor corporation owned no interest in the acquiring
corporation prior to the reorganization. The analysis presented
will be applicable to all amalgamating reorganizations, but a discussion of the complications that arise from common ownership of
the corporations will be deferred until the next section.
The major issue with respect to boot in acquisitive reorganizations is what standards are to be used to determine when the exchange has the "effect of the distribution of a dividend" within the
meaning of section 356(a)(2). A related issue is which corporation's earnings and profits should be considered the source of the
boot. Although the dividend within gain limitation may be anomalous, it is not necessarily illogical in the context of acquisitive
reorganizations. The shareholder is exchanging stock in one corporation for stock in a different corporation plus boot, and gain is
recognized to the extent of the boot. 8 Recovery of basis is typically allowed when an asset is exchanged for something else in a
taxable transaction. 82 The anomaly arises because the boot is
treated as received in exchange of stock for purposes of recovery
of basis, but not for purposes of characterizing the gain. The Internal Revenue Service's view is that the boot always emanates
from a transferor corporation.83 This view is probably consistent
80. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92.
81. Cf., e.g., § 1031(b) (recovery of basis when boot received in a like-kind exchange);
§ 351(b) (same for boot received in connection with contribution to controlled corporation).
82. I.R.C. § 1001.
The dividend within gain limitation was defended on this ground by the Committee on
Taxation of the Philadelphia Bar Association in hearings before the House Ways and
Means Committee concerning H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 21 (1959). Alfred McDowell, who testified on behalf of the Committee on Taxation, also defended the dividend
within gain limitation for "F" reorganizations but was unconvincing. Hearingson Advisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapter C, ., K of the Internal Revenue Code Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., 787-90. The dividend within
gain limitation is much harder to defend in the context of "F" reorganizations than in the
context of acquisitive reorganizations. See also testimony of Crane Hauser of the Committee on Federal Taxation of the Chicago Bar Association, id at 740, 773.
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1.382(c)(2)-l(c)(1) (1963); Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197.
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with congressional intent,84 but it highlights the anomaly of the
gain limitation.
If the distribution of boot emanating from a contraction of the
transferor corporation's business would, absent the reorganization, qualify as a partial liquidation, then the distribution would
not have the effect of a dividend." The distribution of boot would
not, however, typically qualify as a partial liquidation, and
whether boot will have the effect of a dividend will usually depend
on the proper application of the principles of section 302 in interpreting section 356(a)(2). Consequently, in the remainder of this
section it is assumed that the distribution of boot would not qualify as a partial liquidation.
With some oversimplification, three separate approaches can
be identified for applying the principles of section 302 to interpretation of the phrase "effect of the distribution of a dividend" in
section 356(a)(2): (1) the "before and after" test which compares
the distributee's ownership of stock before the reorganization with
the ownership of stock after the reorganization; (2) the "after" test
which compares the distributee's actual ownership in the surviving
corporation after the reorganization with what it would have been
if only stock had been distributed as consideration in the reorganization; (3) the "before" test which compares the distributee's ownership in the transferor corporation as if the boot had been
distributed by the transferor corporation in redemption of its stock
prior to the reorganization with the distributee's actual ownership
6
in the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization.
A simple example can be used to illustrate the different tests.
Suppose A owns all 100 shares of the stock of corporation X,
which is merging into corporation Y. Before the reorganization Y
had 100 shares outstanding, each of which was equal in value to
one share of X stock. In the reorganization A receives 80 shares of
Y and $20 of boot, with Y then having 180 shares outstanding. If
A had received additional stock rather than boot, A would have
owned 100 shares of Y, which would have had 200 shares outstanding. (1) Applying the "before and after" test, A's one hundred percent ownership of X before the reorganization is
compared with a forty-four percent interest (80/180) in Y after the
84. See notes 137-44 infra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
86. If there were a consolidation, both corporations would be considered transferor
corporations and these tests could be applied to shareholders receiving boot from either
corporation.
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reorganization. In this instance, the boot would probably not
have the effect of a dividend. 7 (2) Applying the "after" test, A's
forty-four percent interest in Y is compared with the fifty percent
interest that A would have had if there had been no boot. In this
situation, the boot might or might not have the effect of a dividend."8 (3) Applying the "before" test, A's one hundred percent
interest in X, if the boot had been distributed by X in a redemption prior to the reorganization, is compared with A's actual one
hundred percent interest in X before the reorganization. Clearly,
the boot here has the effect of a dividend.
The "before and after" test is the most advantageous to individual shareholders in acquisitive reorganizations because the distributee's position in the transferor corporation would be
compared with a diminished interest in the larger surviving corporation. The "after" test would be more advantageous to individual shareholders than the "before" test, since a distribution of a
fixed amount of cash or property will cause a greater relative decline in a shareholder's proportionate interest when the shareholder starts with a smaller proportionate interest in a larger
corporation.89
87. The standards of § 302 indicate that a decline in ownership in a corporation from
100% to 44% would not have the effect of a dividend. I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). Of course, § 302
would normally be applied to a shareholder's interest in a single corporation.
88. Section 302(b)(2) would not be satisfied. The redemption might not be essentially
equivalent to a dividend under § 302(b)(1).
89. It can be illustrated algebraically that the "after" test will always result in a greater
relative decline than the "before" test when the distributee of boot had not owned any
stock in the acquiring corporation before the reorganization. Let: S = value of the interest
of distributee of boot in the transferor corporation, C = value or worth of transferor corporation, G = value or worth of acquiring corporation before the merger, B = value of boot
distributed to all shareholders, and R = value of boot distributed only to the shareholder
owning S. The relative decline in value caused by the boot according to the "before" test
is:
S-R
(l)
C-B
S
C
The numerator of this fraction is the shareholder's relative interest in the transferor corporation after the hypothetical redemption; the denominator, the shareholder's relative interest before the hypothetical redemption. The relative decline in value caused by the boot
according to the "after" test is:
(2)
S-R
C+G-B
S
C+G
The numerator of this fraction is the shareholder's actual relative interest in the surviving
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The earlier cases support the "before" test, but the other two
possibilities did not seem to have been considered. 90 Not surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the "before"
test is correct. 9' Recent commentary, on the other hand, has generally supported the "after" or the "before and after" tests. 9z The
most recent cases dealing with this issue seem to reflect a split in
the circuits over whether the "before" or "after" test is appropriate. 93 Notably, the most significant case using the "before and after" test was reversed.94 None of the three tests is completely

satisfactory, but the "before" test appears most consistent with
congressional intent. 95
A.

The "Before and After" Test

The major case adopting the "before and after" test is the district court opinion in Shimberg v. United States.96 Taxpayer
Shimberg owned 90,517 shares of the total 135,521 shares (ap-

proximately sixty-six percent) of common stock of La'Montecorporation; the denominator, the shareholder's relative interest in the surviving corporation had no boot been distributed. It can be shown that (1) is always larger than (2).
Therefore, the fraction represented by (2) will show a greater relative decline.
90. See Commissioner v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934); King Ent., Inc. v. United
States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Isabella M. Sheldon, 6 T.C. 510 (1946); George Woodward, 23
B.T.A. 1259 (1931). See also Shoulson, supra note 42.
91. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975-1 C.B. 112.
92. Cohen, Receipts Related to Corporate Equity, 53 TAXES 824, 840-44 (1975);
Fassler, F/Tlh Circuit's Shimberg Jr. Decision-Automatic Dividend Treatment of Boot in
Acquisitive Reorganizations, 57 TAxEs 159 (1979); Horwood, ClarifiedZ S Position Enhances Planningfor Stock Redemptions With New Shareholders, 46 J. TAX. 338 (1977);
Hurley, Capital Gain Possibilitiesfor Boot in Acquisitive Reorganizations Lessened by
Shimberg Case, 50 J. TAx. 334 (1979); Levin, Adess & McGaffey, Boot Distributions in
CorporateReorganizations, 30 TAX LAW. 287 (1977). See also Battle, Dividends, Redemptions,and Stock Purchasesin Connection with Reorganizations,53 TAXES 845, 852 (1975).

For a student note that supports the "before" test, see Note, Boot Hill-Characterizing
Property Distributed with Corporate Reorganizations, 4 J. CORP. L. 711 (1979). Also of
interest is Note, Boot Distributionsin CorporateReorganizations:DividendEquivalence and
the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 119 (1979).

93. Compare Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1115 (1979), with Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). The court in
Shimberg attempted to distinguish Wright. It is argued, however, that the decisions are
irreconcilable. See text accompanying notes 153-59 infra.
94. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also Sellers v. United States, 42
A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195 (D.C. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
95. See notes 126-45 infra and accompanying text.
96. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also Sellers v. United States, 42 A.F.T.R.2d 78-6195 (D.C. Ala.

1977), rev'a 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Shimberg Corporation (LSC). His wife owned less than two percent of the common stock, and the remaining stock was owned by
nineteen unrelated shareholders. LSC was acquired by MGIC Investment Corporation (MGIC), a publicly held corporation traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, in a transaction which qualified as an "A" reorganization. The shareholders of LSC received
pro rata 32,132 shares of MGIC common stock outright, 32,132
shares of MGIC common stock in escrow, and $625,000 in cash.
Shimberg received 21,461 shares of MGIC common outright,
21,461 shares in escrow, and $417,449 in cash. Earnings and profits of LSC and MGIC were each in excess of $625,000.
In determining that the cash received by Shimberg did not
have the effect of a dividend, the district court relied on United
States v. Davis.9 7 The Supreme Court in Davis held that a redemption must cause "a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation" for the
redemption not to be essentially equivalent to a dividend under
section 302(b)(1).1s In Shimberg the court found that there had
been such a reduction because the taxpayer's interest had decreased from approximately two-thirds of a closely held corporation to less than one percent of a publicly held corporation.
It is clear that the merger resulted in a radical change and
meaningful reduction in the nature of the Plaintiff's interest in
the continuing business. The net effect of the transaction was a
sale by the Plaintiff and the other LSC stockholders of their
LSC stock to MGIC for cash
99 and marketable securities in a
publicly owned corporation.
Taxing boot at capital gain rates because there was a "radical
change and meaningful reduction" in the taxpayer's interest conflicts with the theory underlying the special tax treatment for reorganizations. The rationale for the special treatment is that the
taxpayer is continuing to have an interest in the transferor corporation, albeit in a modified corporate form.1°° Qualification as a
reorganization proceeds upon the theory that there has not been a
radical change in the taxpayer's position and that the transaction
does not have the effect of a sale. The taxpayer in Shimberg did
not recognize any gain on the receipt of MGIC stock and thereby
97. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
98. Id at 313. For a discussion of UnitedStates v. Davis, see Postlewaite & Finneron,
Section 302(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow, 64 VA. L. REv. 561, 569-74 (1978).
99. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
100. See notes 9-29 supra and accompanying text.
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probably benefited from the qualification of the transaction as a
reorganization. He should not have been able to treat the boot as
capital gain on a rationale inconsistent with the qualification of
the transaction as a reorganization.
The "before and after" test should not, however, be summarily
rejected. In Revenue Ruling 75-447, a corporation redeemed
some of the stock owned by its two shareholders at the same time
it sold additional stock to a third party. The Internal Revenue
Service ruled that a redeemed shareholder's original interest in the
corporation should be compared with his or her interest after the
completed transaction to determine if the redemption qualified as
an exchange under section 302(b)(2).1 0 1 This ruling can be extended to distributees of boot in reorganizations, whose position is

analogous to that of the redeemed shareholders in the ruling. Distributees of boot defer gain or loss to the extent that they receive

stock of the acquiring corporation; their interest in the acquiring
corporation is treated as a continuation of their interest in the
transferor corporation. Like the shareholders in Revenue Ruling
75-447, they can be considered to be exchanging part of their interest in the corporate entity for cash or other property while a

simultaneous transformation occurs in that corporate entity. Consequently, it might be argued that the distributees of boot should
be able to qualify for exchange treatment by comparing their interest before and after the transaction as the0 2shareholders covered
under the Revenue Ruling are able to do.'
101. Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113. Two similar fact situations were presented in
the ruling. Two shareholders of a corporation, each owning 50% of the stock, wanted to
bring in a third person with an equal stock interest. In one set of facts the corporation sold
shares of stock to the third party, and the existing shareholders had some of their stock
redeemed. Under the second fact situation the third party purchased some stock from the
two existing shareholders who also had some of their remaining stock redeemed. In order
to meet § 302(b)(2) requirements, each shareholder's 50% interest prior to disposition of the
stock was compared with the 33% interest each owned after the complete transaction.
The discussion in the text assumes that Revenue Ruling 75-447 is correct. This assumption, however, could be questioned. Section 302(b)(2) could be applied by comparing
what the shareholder's interest would be after the sale to the third party but before the
redemption, with the shareholder's actual interest after the redemption. With this treatment of the redemption, any analogy to a reorganization with boot becomes more attenuated. See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra.
102. See Horwood, supra note 92. See also Golub, supra note 67.
In Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969), the equivalent of the "before and after" test
was applied to a redemption immediately prior to a "B" reorganization. The issue in McDonald was the proper taxation of $43,500 in redemptioh proceeds that were distributed to
the majority shareholder immediately before the redeeming corporation was acquired in a
"B" reorganization. The proceeds were financed by a loan incurred in connection with the
reorganization, which was repaid by the acquiring corporation. The Internal Revenue
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The analogy between a redemption that takes place at the
same time as a sale to a third party and a distribution of boot in a
reorganization, however, should not be followed. The basis for
this conclusion is essentially the same rationale used to determine
that the district court opinion in Shimberg was inadequate. In a
reorganization the shareholders of the transferor corporation do
not recognize any realized gain (except to the extent that they receive boot) on the ground that their investment in the transferor
corporation is continuing.' 3 A decline in voting power is a necessary consequence of an acquisitive reorganization. If realized gain
is not recognized despite the decline in voting power, the decline
in voting power should not be the basis for qualifying proceeds as
capital gain."°
Often the distribution of boot will be totally unrelated to concerns about voting power. It is inappropriate in such cases to use
the rationale of Revenue Ruling 75-447 to justify capital gain
treatment, because the additional decline in voting power caused
by the boot is irrelevant to the reasons for distributing the boot."°5
Service did not argue that the $43,500 used to redeem the taxpayer's stock was consideration other than voting stock and that consequently the transaction did not meet the requirements of a tax-free reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B). Instead, the Service's position was
that the $43,500 should be taxed as ordinary income to McDonald because it was a redemption which did not qualify under § 302(b). The Tax Court held that the redemption
was not essentially equivalent to a dividend because the taxpayer's interest was significantly altered by the redemption and reorganization. The taxpayer's interest had changed
from owning almost all the stock of a corporation to being a small shareholder in a publicly
held corporation. Id at 87-88.
Since boot cannot be distributed in a "B" reorganization, McDonaldseems to be a weak
precedent for interpreting § 356. In Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2 C.B. 110, the Internal Revenue Service stated that it should have argued in McDonald that the transaction did not
qualify as a reorganization and that it does not consider the case as precedent.
103. See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
104. The consequence of this conclusion is that transferor corporation shareholders receiving boot would presumably be taxed differently than acquiring corporation shareholders receiving proceeds in redemption of their stock immediately prior to the reorganization.
Under Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113, shareholders of the acquiring corporation
should be able to qualify for capital gain by comparing their interests in the corporation
before the reorganization with their interests after the reorganization. It is anomalous to
treat these shareholders differently. Because of the realization requirement for taxing gain,
however, the two groups of shareholders are not in a similar position. If the transaction
does not qualify as a reorganization, only shareholders of the transferor corporation would
recognize gain or loss on the exchange of stock.
105. Revenue Ruling 75-447 should not apply when a shareholder sells some stock
after a pro rata redemption and the redemption is not, except possibly for tax reasons,
connected with the sale. For example, if a public corporation instead of paying its regular
dividend redeems stock in a pro rata redemption and a shareholder sells some stock immediately after the redemption, the redemption proceeds should not thereby be treated as
received in exchange for stock.
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Yet, any rule based on the motives for distributing the boot would
be virtually impossible to enforce. The "before and after" test applied to reorganizations would allow great opportunity for shareholders of closely held corporations to bail out earnings and
profits at capital gain rates whenever the corporations merged
with larger corporations. It is unlikely that Congress intended the
double benefit of nonrecognition and capital gain for such shareholders.
B.

The 'After" Test

A second approach to the interpretation of the phrase "effect
of the distribution of a dividend" in section 356(a)(2) is illustrated
by Wright v. United States.I0 6 Both the district court and the
Eighth Circuit applied the principles of section 302 by comparing
the shareholder's actual ownership in the surviving corporation to
what the ownership would have been had the shareholder received additional stock rather than boot. Although the taxpayer
owned significant amounts of stock in both corporations consolidated in the reorganization, the approach used by both the district
and appellate courts did not depend on this common ownership.
In Wright v. United States, two corporations, F & G Construction Company (F & G) and World-Wide, Inc., were consolidated
into the newly formed Omni Corporation in a transaction that
qualified as an "A" reorganization. The taxpayer owned approximately 56% of World-Wide and virtually 100% of F & G.10 7 He
received approximately 62% of Omni and Omni's ten-year interest-bearing note for $102,002. Leonard Dunn, a field superintendent of the taxpayer, owned approximately 30% of World-Wide.
Dunn contributed $7,006 in cash to Omni, and, in consideration
for his cash and World-Wide stock, Dunn received a 27.8% interest in Omni. t08 The taxpayer and Dunn also owned 71.5% and
27.9% respectively of another corporation, Danco Construction
106. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), aft'g 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-1466 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
107. The taxpayer's mother owned 13.9% of World-Wide. The Internal Revenue Service did not argue that constructive ownership of stock should be taken into account, and
thus the court considered only the taxpayer's direct ownership of stock. 482 F.2d at 607
n.14. Judge Bright, in dissent, maintained that the mother's stock should be attributed to
the taxpayer. Id. at 610.
108. At the time of the consolidation, F & G's total accumulated earnings and profits
were $101,802 and World-Wide's were $38,365. Because the district and appellate courts
held that the distribution of the note did not have the effect of the distribution of a dividend, they did not reach the issue of whether the $102,002 note would have been out of the
earnings and profits of F & G, World-Wide, or both corporations.
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Company. The taxpayer received the note from Omni, and Dunn
made the capital contribution, so that their relative interests .in
Omni would be the same as their relative interests in Danco Construction. 10 9
The only issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the note
issued to the taxpayer had the effect of a dividend under section
356(a)(2).10° The Eighth Circuit started its analysis by agreeing
"with the Commissioner that section 356(a)(2) should be read in
pari materia with section 302 for the purpose of determining
whether a distribution had the effect of a dividend.""'I The Court
then disagreed with the Commissioner's contention that the "effect
. . . was the same" as if F & G had issued its note prior to the
consolidation in redemption of its own stock or that a portion of
the note was issued in redemption of F & G stock and a portion in
redemption of World-Wide stock. 1 2 The court deemed it "artificial" to consider that the note was issued for any stock other than
that of Omni because the note was part of the entire reorganization and because section 302 assumes a continuing corporation."I3
According to the court, the note reduced the taxpayer's ownership of Omni from approximately 85% to 61.7%. Under the relevant state law a two-thirds vote was required in order to amend
the articles of incorporation and to approve a merger, consolidation, or liquidation. Therefore, the court considered this decline
in voting power to be significant. Citing United States v. Davis,"4
the Eighth Circuit held that the boot did not have the effect of a
dividend. 5
109. The court did not give any explanation for the discrepancy between the taxpayer's
interest in Omni and in Danco. Judge Bright in dissent in the Eighth Circuit speculated
that the taxpayer included the Omni stock owned by his mother in determining that his
interest in Omni was the same as it was in Danco. 482 F.2d at 610.
110. In considering this issue, the district court noted that if the taxpayer had received
additional Omni stock rather than the note, he would have owned 85% of Omni instead of
61.7%. The court then held that this substantial reduction meant that the note did not have
the effect of a dividend. The district court did not explain its reasoning further or give any
citations.
111. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 1973). Other cases have also
stated that sections 356(a)(2) and 302 are inparimateria.See, e.g., Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793, 797 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959).
112. 482 F.2d at 606-07. Because the taxpayer had owned virtually 100% ofF & G, the
distribution of the note in redemption of F & G stock would clearly have had the effect of a
dividend.
113. Id at 607.
114. 397 U.S. 301 (1970). See text accompanying note 97 supra.
115. 482 F.2d at 608-09.
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The Eighth Circuit was misled by the statement that section
356(a)(2) should be read "in pari materia" with section 302.116
Section 302 can be helpful in interpreting the phrase "effect of the
distribution of a dividend," but section 356(a)(2) does not
mechanically incorporate section 302. Because of the corporate

transformation in an amalgamating reorganization, the distribution of boot is not equivalent to a redemption."' 7 Additionally,
there are many discrepancies between the taxation of a redemption that is essentially equivalent to a dividend and the taxation of
boot that has the effect of a dividend." 8 Therefore, the issue
should not be approached by considering whether the application
of section 302 to a hypothetical redemptibn by the transferor or by
the acquiring corporation is less artificial. 1 9
The "after" test, judged on its own merits, is not appropriate.' 20 It is unreasonable to characterize boot according to a result
that would have occurred had there been no boot in the reorganization and in an unrelated transaction the surviving corporation

had then distributed the boot in redemption of its own shares.
The stock which the boot supposedly replaced never existed. It is

mere guesswork to predict the quantity and type of stock that
would have existed if not for the existence of boot. Furthermore,

a distributee of boot may never have had the option of receiving
this hypothetical stock in the surviving corporation; the original
shareholders of the acquiring corporation may have insisted that
boot be distributed.' 2' To assume that the distributee of boot gave
116. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
117. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
118. See notes 41-57 supra and accompanying text.
119. The Eighth Circuit buttressed its holding in Wright by using a variation of the
"before and after" test.
Also, viewing the transaction as a realistic whole, the taxpayer has reduced his
holding in one corporation, F & G, from almost complete ownership in F & G to
61.7 per cent ownership in Omni. In contrast, his ownership in World Wide was
56 per cent in relation to his 61.7 per cent ownership in Omni, which either
before or after the redemption would make no difference under the above twothirds requirements of Arkansas law.
482 F.2d at 609-10. The discussion of the "before and after" test can be considered dictum.
120. But see Levin, Adess & McGaffey, supra note 92; Moore, supra note 66 at 147-49.
Levin, Adess, and McGaffey in their article argue that Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113
(see note 101 supra) and Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82 (1969) (see note 102 supra),
provide direct support for the "after" test. Actually, these authorities more directly support
the "before and after" test. See notes 96-105 supra and accompanying text. See also
Horwood, supra note 92.
121. It would not be appropriate to use the "after" test in only those cases where it can
be demonstrated that the distributee of boot had the choice of boot or additional stock. If
beneficial tax consequences will follow, parties to a transaction will almost invariably be
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up stock for the boot will often be pure fiction. For example, in
Wright it is possible that the other shareholders in World-Wide
would have refused to allow consolidation with F & G had the
taxpayer not agreed to accept a note rather than additional stock.
A test similar to the "after" test can be formulated from the
concept that the acquiring corporation in an amalgamating reorganization is in many respects treated as the continuation of the
transferor corporation.12 2 Accordingly, a shareholder of the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization might be viewed as a
shareholder of both corporations considered together. The shareholder's proportionate interest in the acquiring corporation after
the reorganization could then be compared with his or her proportionate interest in the transferor and acquiring corporations considered together before the reorganization. The results of this
comparison would show what portion of his or her interest had
been exchanged for boot and could be used to determine if the
boot had the effect of a dividend. The "after" test uses basically
the same comparison; the shareholder's interest after the reorganization is compared with what his or her interest would have been
in the acquiring corporation if no boot had been distributed. If no
boot had been distributed, the acquiring corporation, after the reorganization, would be comprised of itself and the transferor corporation as they existed before the reorganization. This
alternative formulation of the "after" test emphasizes the extent to
which the boot causes a change in value of the shareholder's interest, rather than a change in voting power. Although the previous
formulation of the "after" test focused on the change in voting
power, this change was based on a hypothetical distribution of
123
voting stock.
ready to demonstrate that it was the transferor corporation shareholders who wanted boot
distributed. Additionally, it would be anomalous for shareholders to receive preferential
capital gain rates (assuming there was a gain) when those shareholders wanted the cash or
other property, but for the shareholders to have ordinary income when compelled by others
to take the boot in lieu of additional stock.
122. For some ways in which the surviving corporation is treated as a continuation of
both corporations, see text accompanying notes 9-17 supra. In other respects, however, the
two corporations continue to be treated as separate entities. The transferor corporation
ends its taxable year on the date of the reorganization. I.R.C. § 381(b)(1). This can affect
the carryforward of items such as net operating losses. In addition, losses of the surviving
corporation cannot be carried back to a pre-reorganization year of the transferor corporation. I.R.C. § 381(b)(2). If the combination of corporations qualifies as an "F' reorganization, however, these conclusions would have to be modified. I.R.C. § 381(b). See note 37
supra.

123. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
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This alternative justification for the "after" test should, however, be rejected. It is overly artificial and carries a theoretical
concept too far. 124 Two corporations, which existed as separate

legal, tax, and accounting entities, should not be treated as a single
entity without a special reason. No such reason appears here.
Nothing can be gleaned from the policy behind section 302

that would justify taxing boot as capital gain on the basis of a
hypothetical redemption by the acquiring corporation.

25

There is

no reason to suppose that congressional concern for shareholders
of closely held corporations should be extended beyond the non-

recognition provisions generally applicable in reorganizations.
The adjustment of interests inherent in a reorganization need not

be subsidized further by allowing boot to be taxed as capital gain
pursuant to the "after" test.
C.

The "Before" Pest

The third method of interpreting the phrase "effect of the distribution of a dividend" in section 356(a)(2) is the "before" test.

Under this approach a comparison is made between the distributee's ownership in the transferor corporation as if the boot had
been distributed by the transferor corporation in redemption of its
stock prior to the reorganization and the distributee's actual ownership in the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization.
26
Some early cases support the application of the "before" test.'
These decisions do not discuss why the boot is regarded as having
been distributed by the transferor corporation, despite the obvious
fact that the transaction is not a simple distribution by the transferor corporation.' 7 These cases, therefore, are subject to the
124. See note 122 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
126. As one opinion stated: "The distribution on a pro rata basis, entailing no substantially disproportionate change in the continuing equity interests of the [transferor corporation's] shareholders, constitutes a classic example of a transaction having the effect of the
distribution of a dividend." King Ent., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 521 (Ct. Cl.
1969). Accord, Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Ross v. United
States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959). The automatic dividend test was rejected or distinguished in Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp.
807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958), and William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408
(1963). In determining whether the boot had the effect of a dividend in these cases, the
courts used criteria which are not generally relevant.
127. See, ag., Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
875 (1959). The court stated that the cash distributed in the reorganization (which had its
origin in the acquiring corporation) should be considered as a distribution from the transferor corporation because the distribution had the same effect as a distribution by the trans-
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same type of criticism that was leveled at Wright v. United
States. t28 The boot is not simply being distributed by the transferor corporation, and it is not clear why section 356 should be
interpreted as if it were.
The opinion of the Fifth Circuit, reversing the district court in
Shimberg v. United States, 29 also supports the application of the
"before" test. The Fifth Circuit held that the pro rata distribution
of boot to shareholders of the transferor corporation, when a
closely held corporation was merged into a publicly owned corporation, had the effect of a dividend for the majority shareholder.
The court viewed the distribution of boot as a substitute for a distribution by the transferor corporation.
Judge Thornberry, writing for the court, relied on the concept
of a reorganization.
The theory behind tax-free corporate reorganizations is that
the transaction is merely "a continuance of the proprietary interests in the continuing enterprise under modified corporate
form.

...

If a pro rata distribution of profits from a continuing corporation is a dividend, and a corporate reorganization is a "continuance of the proprietary interests in the continuing
enterprise under modified corporate form," it follows that the
pro rata distribution of "boot" to shareholders of one of the
participating corporations must certainly have the "effect of the
distributiont 30 of a dividend" within the meaning of
§ 356(a)(2).
The distribution is pro rata, however, only with respect to a corporation that, as part of the transaction, is terminating its separate
feror corporation. However, the distribution also had the same effect as a redemption by
the acquiring corporation after the reorganization.
128. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 116-19 supra.
129. 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev'd, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). See also General Housewares Corp. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1056
(5th Cir. 1980); Sellers v. United States, 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
For comments on Shimberg, all of which are critical of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see
Fassler, supra note 92; Hurley, supra note 92; Note, Treatment of Cash Distributions to
ShareholdersPursuantto CorporateReorganization, 20 B.C.L. REV. 601 (1979); Note, Dirtribution ofBoot to Shareholders of Merged CorporationTaxable as Dividend Not Capital
Gain, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1059; Note, Taxation oBoot Distributions- A Return to Bedford?, 7 HOFSTPA L. REV. 987 (1979); Note, Reorganizationand CapitalGains-A Forgotten
Concept?, 41 U. PiTr. L. REV. 291 (1980); Note, Taxation ofBoot Received DuringAcquisitive Reorganization.: Dividend v. CapitalGains, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 621 (1979); Note, Determining DividendEquivalence of "Boot" Received in a CorporateReorganization, 32 TAX
LAW. 834 (1979).
For a student comment approving the Fifth Circuit decision, see Note, Boot Hill-,
supra note 92.
130. 577 F.2d at 288.
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existence. Thus, Judge Thornberry's opinion that the distribution
is pro rata is more conclusion than fact.
Judge Thornberry also cited portions of the Committee Reports for the Revenue Act of 1924, which discussed the predecessor to section 356(a)(2).'1' The bulk of the discussion in both the
House and Senate reports concerns a transfer by a corporation of
all its assets to a newly formed corporate shell with the same ownership-a transaction very different fronf the one before the court.
This difference was ignored; Judge Thornberry stated simply that
the example in the legislative history was "virtually the same fact
situation" as the case he was considering. 32 In any event, the invocation of this example without analysis is not helpful. Since the
cited example indicates that the House and Senate Committees
did not fully understand the bill they were enacting,13 3 its persuasiveness is not compelling.
The underlying reason for the court's decision was that the
distribution of boot was viewed as a substitute for a distribution
by the transferor corporation before the merger. As the court
stated, "[t]he taxpayer should not be able to reap the benefits of
capital gain treatment simply because he received his share of the
distribution after the merger in the form of a 'boot' rather than
before the merger in the form of a dividend."' 34 Judge Thornberry created a presumption, apparently irrebuttable, that the boot is
payment to the transferor corporation shareholders of any earnings and profits retained by the transferor corporation.
It is apparent that taxpayer, who controlled [the transferor corporation] made a considered decision to utilize the corporation's retained earnings for purposes other than payment of a
dividend. It cannot be said that [the transferor corporation]
was unable to pay a dividend; rather,forreasonsnot revealedin
the record, it chose not to do so. Moreover, despite taxpayer's
protestations to the contrary, it seems clear that the merger operated as a device for "bailing out" [the transferor corporatied up in
tion's] retained earnings, which were evidently
35
certain aspects of the business' operation.'
Apparently, Judge Thornberry created this presumption because
he considered the pro rata distribution of boot to the shareholders
131.
Cong.,
132.
133.
134.
135.

H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th
1st Sess. 15-16 (1924). For the history of § 356, see note 38 supra.
577 F.2d at 289.
See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
577 F.2d at 289.
Id (emphasis added).
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of the transferor corporation to be a device for bailing out earnings and profits. Given the various ways in which earnings and
profits can be extracted from a corporation at capital gains rates,
however, it is not clear why the boot distributed
to Shimberg
13 6
should be condemned as a device for a bailout.
Despite the apparent shortcomings of the Shimberg opinion,
the court's conclusion that the boot should be viewed as a substitute for distributions by the transferor corporation prior to the
merger is not necessarily an unacceptable approach. In reaching
its conclusion, the court should have probed congressional intent
more deeply. Under such an examination, it appears that, for the
purpose of determining whether the boot has the effect of a dividend, Congress intended the boot to be viewed as a substitute for
a distribution by the transferor corporation prior to the reorganization.' 37 An analysis of the language and legislative history behind section 356 supports this view.
A literal reading of section 356 suggests that in an acquisitive
reorganization the transferor corporation must be considered the
source of any earnings and profits that are distributed. Section
356(a)(2) provides that if the exchange has the effect of a dividend,
the recognized gain shall be treated as a dividend to the extent of
the distributee's ratable share of earnings and profits of "thecorporation. ,138 The term, "the corporation," must refer to the transferor corporation.' 9 It would be very awkward to refer to a
distributee's ratable share of earnings and profits in a corporation
of which he or she was becoming a shareholder in the same transaction in which the distribution of earnings and profits was made.
If the transaction were viewed as a distribution of the acquiring
136. For example, a pro rata redemption made at the same time that some or all of the
remaining stock is sold to a third party can be used to extract earnings and profits at capital
gain rates. See Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954); Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2
C.B. 167; Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 C.B. 113.
137. See text accompanying notes 138-42 infra.
138. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (emphasis added).
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(2)-1(c)(1) (1963). See also Shimberg v. United States, 577
F.2d 283, 289 n.15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Commissioner v.
Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1934); Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204, 230-31
(1970); Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197; Rev. Rul. 56-220, 1956-1 C.B. 191; Rev. Rul.
56-345, 1956-2 C.B. 206. In Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the boot is distributed from
the earnings and profits of both the transferor and acquiring corporations. See notes
168-70 infra and accompanying text. That conclusion can probably be limited to situations
where the transferor and acquiring corporations had the same shareholders. See Shimnberg
v. United States, 577 F.2d at 289 n.15.
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corporation's earnings and profits, it would not be clear whether
the shareholder's ratable share would be based on actual stock
ownership in the acquiring corporation after the merger or on hypothetical ownership as if only stock and no boot had been received in the reorganization. On the other hand, "ratable share of
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation" has a natural and unambiguous meaning when the term, "the corporation,"
refers to the transferor corporation. It would be the shareholder's
proportionate share of the transferor corporation's earnings and
profits prior to the transaction. Support for this position can also
be derived from the Regulations for section 381, which assume
that the boot is distributed from the earnings and profits of the
transferor corporation. 140 Furthermore, the 1924 Committee Reports for section 203(d)(2), the predecessor of section 356(a)(2),
indicate that Congress was concerned with the distribution of the
41
transferor corporation's earnings and profits.'
Because Congress viewed the boot as a distribution of the
transferor corporation's earnings and profits, Congress would
probably have considered it an abuse if the boot distributed in a
reorganization were taxed as capital gain when a distribution by
the transferor corporation without a reorganization would be
taxed as ordinary income. Shareholders of the transferor corporation should not be able to use a reorganization to convert what
would be ordinary income into capital gain. Similarly, there
would be no abuse if boot were taxed at capital gain rates when,
prior to the reorganization and judged by the standards of section
302, the same distribution by the transferor corporation would
also have qualified as capital gain. Thus, for purposes of interpreting section 356(a), the distribution of boot should be viewed as
by the transferor corporation prior
a substitute for a distribution
14 2
to the reorganization.
The "before" test, as applied in this situation, is both reasonable and fair. The distributee of boot realizes some or all of the
value from earnings of the transferor corporation at the time of
the reorganization rather than realizing it at a prior time. In con140. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(2)-1(c)(I) (1963). See Rev. Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197;
American Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
141. See note 43 supra.
142. Both the House bill in 1954 and the proposed amendments of the Advisory Group
on Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would have made explicit the
"before" test. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 306 (1954); H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 21 (1959).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1:1

trast, neither the "after" test nor the "before and after" test seems
to produce a satisfactory result in these reorganization cases. It
must be noted, however, that the significant differences which exist between the taxation of boot and the taxation of distributions
43
by ongoing corporations are inconsistent with the "before" test.1
It might be possible to formulate arguments rationalizing these
differences," but the differences should rather be accepted simply
as anomalies that are at variance with the basic view of the transaction held by Congress. Despite these problems, the argument
that the "before" test best reflects congressional intent remains
strong.
The "before" test allows boot to be taxed at capital gain rates
when appropriate. If prior to the reorganization the shareholder
could have sold to the transferor corporation in a qualified 302(a)
redemption the amount of stock that was actually exchanged for
boot, the shareholder should still generally be entitled to exchange
treatment when the sale occurs as part of a reorganization. That
the shareholder is exchanging an interest in one corporation for a
smaller proportionate interest in a larger corporation at the same
time as the sale does not cause the proceeds to more closely resemble a dividend.
Furthermore, there is no policy reason for extending the preferential tax treatment of boot beyond the level permitted by the
"before" test. The distribution of boot is a distribution by a corporation or its successor to its shareholders. Normally distributions to a shareholder are taxable as dividends to the extent of
earnings and profits. In some situations, such as for redemptions
qualifying under section 302(a), Congress has provided for the
more favorable capital gain treatment. The reasons for extending
capital gain treatment to these distributions,
however, do not
45
readily apply to distributions of boot.1
D. Application of the "Before" Test
In order to determine whether boot in an acquisitive reorgani143. See notes 41-57 supra and accompanying text.
144. For example, the distributee of boot can be viewed as exchanging an interest in the
transferor corporation for stock of the acquiring corporation plus boot. To the extent the
interest in the transferor corporation is comprised of an interest in earnings and profits, any
recognized gain can be viewed as recognized in connection with a noncapital asset. This
formulation would explain the dividend within gain limitation in acquisitive reorganizations.
145. See text accompanying notes 71-80 supra.
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zation has the effect of a dividend under section 356(a)(2), the
principles of section 302 should be applied to a hypothetical distribution of the boot by the transferor corporation in redemption of
its own stock. The relevant factor in applying the principles of
section 302 is, therefore, the degree of interest in the transferor
corporation that the distributee would have to give up for the
boot.' 46 More emphasis than is normal under section 302 should
be placed on the value of the interest that the distributee is exchanging for the boot because changes in voting power have no
future significance. Simlarly, it would be overly artificial to place
any significance on the absolute level of the distributee's interest
in a corporation that is losing its separate existence.
Therefore, if the hypothetical redemption would have caused a
sufficient decline in the distributee's interest in the transferor corporation, so that the redemption would have been substantially
disproportionate within the meaning of section 302(b)(2), the boot
would normally not have the effect of a dividend, even though the
distributee would have held more than fifty percent of the voting
power in the transferor corporation after the hypothetical redemption. 4 7 Furthermore, rulings which hold that redemptions are not
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 302(b)(1) becriticause the shareholder's voting control is reduced below some
48
distribution.
boot
the
to
relevant
be
not
would
point
cal
It is not clear whether the constructive ownership rules of section 318 should be used in applying the "before" test. Section 356
is not one of the sections to which section 318 is made expressly
applicable. ' 49 Nevertheless, section 318 could be subsumed in the
principles of section 302 which are utilized to determine whether
boot has the effect of a dividend under section 356(a)(2). '" It ap146. Naturally, there will be problems when this test is applied to specific situations.
For example, if the distributee of boot owned shares in more than one class of stock in the
transferor corporation, it could make a difference which shares are considered to have been
redeemed. Shares in each class of stock should probably be considered to be redeemed in
the proportion equal to the relative values of each class owned by the distributee.
147. Section 302(b)(2) requires both that the distribution be disproportionate and that
the distributees, after the redemption, own less than 50% of the voting power.
148. See Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. Il1 (reduction in voting power from 57% to
50%); Rev. Rul. 75-512, 1975-2 C.B. 112 (reduction in voting power from 30% to 24.3%);
Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2 C.B. 91 (reduction in voting power from 27% to 22.7%). See also
Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1973).
149. I.R.C. § 318(b). See Hurley, supra note 92, at 338; note 107 supra. The Internal
Revenue Service in a private ruling has taken the position that § 318 is not applicable to
distributions of boot. IRS, Priv. Letter Rul. 7912101 (1978).
150. See Shoulson, supra note 42, at 608.
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pears inconsistent to apply rules from section 302 without taking
account of the constructive ownership principles. Therefore, the
rules of section 318 should probably be applied to distributions of
boot in reorganizations.
V.

COMBINATIONS OF CORPORATIONS THAT HAVE AT LEAST
SOME COMMON OWNERSHIP

This section examines the taxation of boot distributed in amalgamating reorganizations in which the corporations had at least
some common shareholders prior to the reorganization. One major issue is whether the proposed interpretation of section 356 is
still valid when there are common shareholders. A second issue in
transactions where there is complete or nearly complete identity of
shareholders of the corporations involved is whether the form of
the transaction should be disregarded and the boot taxed as a distribution by an ongoing corporation under section 301, rather
than under section 356.
A. Interpretationof Section 356
1. The Continuing Validity of the "Before" Test
Congress enacted the predecessor of section 356(a)(2) because
it was concerned that a reorganization should not provide an opportunity to distribute the transferor corporation's earnings and
profits at capital gain rates.' 5 ' This concern did not depend on
the absence of common ownership between the corporations involved in the reorganization. When such common ownership exists, the intent of Congress would still be that boot should not be
taxed at capital gain rates unless a distribution of the property
prior to the reorganization would also have been taxed at capital
gain rates.152 Therefore, the general approach of the "before" test
should remain valid.
The Fifth Circuit, which used the "before" test in Shimberg v.
United States,153 suggested, however, that it might alter its basic
approach depending on certain characteristics of the amalgamating reorganization, including common ownership of the corporations prior to the reorganization. The court took the position that
its decision in Shimberg did not conflict with Wright v. United
151. See text accompanying notes 138-42 supra.
152. Id.
153. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
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States, 54 in which the Eighth Circuit used the "after" test. The
transaction in Wright was "as if there had been only one corporation all along and as if one shareholder had redeemed his
stock."' 55 With this recasting of the transaction by the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayer in Wright was viewed as owning 85% of the two
56
corporations considered together before the reorganization.
The Fifth Circuit then identified three factors that made it inappropriate to consider the distribution in Shimberg in this way: (1)
the corporations in the merger were of much different size, (2)
there was no common ownership between the two corporations,
of the
and (3) the boot was distributed pro rata to all shareholders
57
transferor corporation rather than to a single individual.1
For purposes of characterizing the boot, the taxpayer in Shimberg could also have been viewed as a shareholder of both the
acquiring corporation and the transferor corporation considered
as one entity prior to the merger. Shimberg's interest in the transferor corporation relative to the value of both corporations prior
to the reorganization would be compared with his interest in the
acquiring corporation after the reorganization to determine if the
boot had the effect of a dividend. This approach is the alternative
formulation of the "after" test, which was rejected in the previous
section as too artificial.' 5 8 None of the factors mentioned by the
Fifth Circuit in distinguishing Shimberg from Wright makes it
more appropriate to use this approach in Wright than in Shimberg. Thus, this approach should not be used in either case.
Neither the relative size of the corporations involved nor the proportionality of the distribution of boot affects the propriety of
viewing the two corporations as a single entity prior to the reorganization. Similarly, common ownership of the two corporations
prior to the reorganization is not a basis for ignoring the separate
existence of the two entities. The corporations were distinct tax,
legal, and accounting entities, and the shareholders may have benefited by the existence of the two entities. 5 9
In a case such as Wright it is particularly inappropriate to tax
154. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
155. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.

1115 (1979).
156. Id at 287 n.12.
157. Id at 287.
158. See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
159. For example, only one of the corporations may have had earnings and profits.
Therefore, distributions from the other corporation would not have been taxable to the
extent of the shareholder's basis in the stock and, to the extent it was in excess of basis, the
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the boot at capital gain rates on the ground that common ownership of the two corporations should cause them to be viewed as a
single entity. If the distributee of boot owns an interest in more
than one party to the reorganization, the joint ownership should
probably cause the boot to be less qualified for preferential treatment as capital gain. Since the distributee owns an interest in
both corporations, the reorganization involves less of an exchange
than if he or she owned an interest in only one corporation. The
existence of an exchange is normally a prerequisite for gain to
qualify as capital gain.
2.

The "'Before"Test Should Not Be Modified

The "before" test represents a particular interpretation of section 356 that was formulated with regard to reorganizations in
which there had been no common ownership of the corporations.
The issue remains whether that interpretation should be modified
when some common ownership exists. For distributees of boot
who had owned an interest in the acquiring corporation as well as
in the transferor corporation, the most likely modification would
entail tax treatment of part or all of the boot as if there had been a
distribution prior to the reorganization by the acquiring corporation rather than the transferor corporation. 60 It is suggested below that this modification of the "before" test should not be
adopted. Treating some or all of the boot as if there had been a
distribution by the acquiring corporation would place too great a
strain on the language of section 356 and lead to undesirable results.
It would be inconsistent with the statutory language to treat
some boot as if there had been a distribution by the transferor
corporation and other boot as if there had been a distribution by
the acquiring corporation. t6 1 Section 356(a)(2) states that some
amount (depending on gain and earnings and profits) will be
taxed as a dividend "if an exchange. . . has the effect of the disdistribution would have been taxable as capital gain. I.R.C. § 301(c)(3)(a). If the two corporations had been combined, all distributions may have been taxable as a dividend.
160. The same corporation would be looked to both for a determination of whether the
boot had the effect of a dividend and for the amount of earnings and profits.
161. For an example of such treatment, suppose that a distributee of boot owned all the
stock of the acquiring corporation and 10% of the stock of the transferor corporation. If no
other shareholders received boot, some of the boot would be considered as originating in
the acquiring corporation and would probably have the effect of a dividend. The rest of
the boot distribution would be considered as originating in the transferor corporation and
would probably not have the effect of a dividend.
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tribution of a dividend." The statute contemplates that for a particular shareholder the whole exchange16 2either has the effect of a
distribution of a dividend or does not.
For a particular distributee of boot who had owned an interest
in both the acquiring and transferor corporations, the possibility
still remains that the exchange could have the effect of the distribution of a dividend by hypothesizing that there was a redemption
by the acquiring corporation, rather than by the transferor corporation, prior to the reorganization. For example, suppose A, B,
and C own all the stock of corporation X, and A owns all the
stock of corporation Y. If X merges into Y and if A and B receive
boot, it might seem appropriate to conclude that the exchange
made by A has the effect of the distribution of a dividend by hypothesizing that the boot received by A had been distributed in a
redemption by Y, rather than being distributed by X. This is not
an appropriate interpretation, however. The determination of
whether boot received by A or B is taxed as a dividend should not
be made by looking at a distribution of earnings and profits by
different corporations. Both A and B are exchanging stock in X
for stock in Y plus boot, and both should be treated alike by having the same standards applied to determine if the boot should be
taxed as a dividend.
More generally, if the "before" test can be applied by looking
solely to the acquiring corporation for some shareholders, the resulting inconsistency among shareholder as to which corporation
is the source of the boot will be troublesome. Such an approach
would also appear incongruent with taxing the boot only to the
extent of the shareholder's gain on the exchange of stock in the
transferor corporation. Finally, any inquiry into which corporation is the actual source of the boot would not be appropriate because it would be inconsistent with taxation of boot in
reorganizations in which there had been no common ownership
prior to the reorganization. 6 3
The "before" test should be applied by examining the effects
of a hypothetical redemption by only the transferor corporation
prior to the reorganization. This approach is consistent with congressional intent and leads to a reasonable, untortured interpretation of section 356. The sole interpretive problem might arise
162. If the exchange has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, the portion of the
boot that is actually treated as a dividend will, of course, depend on the amount of earnings
and profits.
163. See text accompanying notes 76, 137-42 supra.
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when two corporations consolidate into a newly formed corporation and a distributee of boot owned an interest in both corporations.1 64 In such a situation, there are two transferor corporations.
Thus, the distributee should probably be considered as receiving
boot from each corporation in proportion to the relative value of
his or her interest in the respective corporations. Section 356
would then be applied separately with respect to each transferor
corporation.
The relevant cases have involved combinations of identically
owned corporations with a pro rata distribution of boot. 165 There
was a sale of assets by the transferor corporation to the acquiring
corporation, followed by the liquidation of the transferor corporation. Despite this form, the transactions were found to be "D,"
and possibly "F," reorganizations, 66 and in each of these cases,
the boot clearly had the effect of a dividend. The courts, however,
have disagreed on whether the boot arose from earnings and profits of only the transferor corporation or from earnings and profits
67
of both transferor and acquiring corporations. 1

In Davant v. United States, 68 the Fifth Circuit gave several
reasons why the pro rata distribution of cash in a reorganization of identically owned corporations should be taxed as a
dividend to the extent of earnings and profits of both corporations. One of the reasons 69 was that in such reorganizations
"earnings and profits of the corporation" in section 356(a)(2)
should be interpreted as referring to earnings and profits
of both corporations.' 7 0 On the other hand, the Tax
164. This was exactly the situation in Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1973). See notes 106-19 supra and accompanying text.
165. See Atlas Tool Co., 70 T.C. 86 (1978), art'd, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 110 (1980); Estate of Bell 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1971); American Mfg. Co., 55
T.C. 204 (1970); South Tex. Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 540 (1965),
rev'dsub noma. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967). See also James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
166. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
167. This issue usually arises because the distributee's share of accumulated earnings
and profits in the transferor corporation is less than the amount of recognized gain. In
American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970), there was a different reason. The sole shareholder
of the transferor and acquiring corporations was a corporation, and the acquiring corporation was incorporated in a foreign country. Any distribution emanating from its earnings
and profits would not have qualified for the dividend received deduction under § 243. See
generally note 55 supra and accompanying text.
168. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
169. For a discussion of the other reasons, see text accompanying notes 18 1-85 infra.
170. In Rev. Rul. 70-240, 1970-1 C.B. 81, the Internal Revenue Service agreed with
this alternative holding in Davant. In the ruling, a single shareholder owned all the stock

NONQUALIFYING PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS

Court' 7 ' and the Third Circuit' 72 have held that the term, "the
corporation," in section 356(a)(2) refers only to the transferor corporation. 7 3 It is argued in the following subsection that the boot
in these cases should have been taxed under section 301, not section 356.174 The approach of the Tax Court and the Third Circuit,
however, is consistent with the interpretation of section 356 that is
being advocated in this Article t75 and should be followed whenever taxation of the boot under section 301 is not appropriate.

If there is a reorganization involving corporations with common ownership and if the boot is taxed under section 356, the
proposed interpretation of section 356 does leave a loophole. The
of corporations X and Y. X transferred its operating assets to Y for their fair market value
in cash and liquidated. The transaction was held to qualify as a "D" reorganization and
property received by the shareholder was out of earnings and profits of both corporations.
The ruling also held that, for purposes of computing gain under § 356(a), the shareholder
had constructively received an amount of Y stock equal to the value of assets transferred by
X to Y. Apparently, the form of the cash being paid for these assets was disregarded. The
Tax Court has rejected these conclusions in American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204, 299-31
(1970).
171. Atlas Tool Co., 70 T.C. 86 (1978), ar'd,614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 110 (1980); Paul Altenpohl, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1377 (1977); Estate of Bell, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1221 (1971); American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970); South Tex. Rice Warehouse
Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965), rev'd sub noma. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
172. Atlas Tool Co., 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 110 (1980).
173. The reasons for this conclusion were most fully set forth in the Tax Court's opinion in American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204 (1970). The Tax Court cited as support the example
contained in the Committee Reports to the Revenue Acts of 1924 which illustrated the
operation of the predecessor to section 356(a)(2). H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
14-15 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1924). The example involved
the transfer of assets by a corporation to a newly formed corporate shell with the same
ownership. In this situation, the statute prevented boot from being taxed at capital gain
rates. This legislative history does indicate that Congress was concerned primarily with
preventing a bailout of earnings and profits by the transferor corporation. See notes
131-33 supra and accompanying text. Because the acquiring corporation in the example
obviously had no earnings and profits prior to the reorganization, however, the example
does not by itself demonstrate that Congress would not have been concerned with a bailout
of earnings and profits by the acquiring corporation under other circumstances. The Tax
Court also stated that the interrelation of § 356 with § 354 shows that the boot arises out of
earnings and profits only of the transferor corporation. The court's reasoning was that
since the parties to the exchange in § 354 are the shareholder and the transferor corporation, it is logical to limit "the corporation" in § 356 to the transferor corporation only. It is,
however, not clear why the transferor corporation, rather than the acquiring corporation, is
a party to the exchange in § 354. Furthermore, even if the transferor corporation is a party
to the exchange, the conclusion that boot arises out of earnings and profits of the transferor
corporation does not necessarily follow. The holding in American Manufacturing should
simply be justified by the general arguments in the text for the "before" test. See notes
161-63 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 193-97 infra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 161-63 supra and accompanying text.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1:1

characterization of boot depends upon a.hypothetical redemption
by only the transferor corporation. Under certain circumstances,
the choice of which corporation will survive the merger can affect
whether boot is taxed as a dividend.' 7 6 Furthermore, when the
combining corporations are controlled by the same shareholders,
it appears artificial to conclude that the distribution is out of the
earnings and profits of only one of the corporations. The possibility of abuse in the most egregious situation, however, should not
be present. When corporations with identical ownership are combined and there is a pro rata distribution of boot to shareholders,
the boot should be taxed under section 301 rather than section
356.177

B.

Taxation of Boot UndeF Section 301

An important question presently unresolved is whether it is
ever appropriate to tax boot under section 301, rather than under
section 356, on the ground that the boot is functionally unrelated
to the reorganization. If the boot were taxed under section 301,
there would be no dividend within gain limitation and any distributed property would be taxed as a dividend to the extent of current or accumulated earnings and profits.
The two most significant cases on this issue are the Fifth Circuit decision in Davant v. United States 178 and the Tax Court decision in American Manufacturing Co. ,17 both of which involved a
combination of identically owned corporations with pro rata distributions of cash to shareholders. In addition to its interpretation
of section 356(a)(2) discussed in the previous subsection, 80 the
Fifth Circuit in Davant gave two other reasons for taxing the cash
as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits of both corporations. One reason was that the distribution of cash had no functional relationship to the reorganization; both events merely
occurred at the same time.' 8' Therefore, the court held that the
cash should be taxed under sections 301 and 316, rather than
176. This problem, however, is inherent in the structure of § 356. Boot is taxed to the
extent of gain, and choice of a corporation as the transferor can affect the amount of gain
realized.
177. See notes 193-97 infra and accompanying text.
178. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
179. 55 T.C. 204 (1970). The Third Circuit did not consider this argument in Atlas
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978), afl'd, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 110 (1980).
180. See text accompanying notes 168-70 supra.
181. See also Morris v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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under section 356, because its tax treatment should not have been
affected by the reorganization. l 2 The other reason involved the
court's finding that the combination of corporations qualified as
an "F," as well as a "D," reorganization.183 The court stated that

any cash distributed to a shareholder in an "F" reorganization-defined as a "mere change in identity, form, or place of incorporation"--should be taxed under section 301. 4 Although
stated as a separate reason, this position should probably be

viewed as an application of the court's functionally unrelated test.
Because of the nature of an "F" reorganization, any cash distribution could be considered functionally unrelated to the reorganization." 5 The court discussed these theories only in relation to
whether the distributions were out of earnings and profits; the div-

idend within gain limitation of section 356 was not mentioned.
In American ManufacturingCo. 186 and other cases, 187 the Tax

Court has rejected the functionally unrelated approach of Davant. 88 The Tax Court felt that this approach would make sec182. The Fifth Circuit cited Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), which involved a transaction that purported to be a recapitalization qualifying under the predecessor to § 368(a)(1)(E). The shareholders of a corporation had exchanged their stock for new
stock plus debentures. The Supreme Court described the distribution of debentures as "unrelated" to the exchange of stock and held the debentures were taxable as a dividend.
The Supreme Court concluded that the exchange of stock did not qualify as a recapitalization under the predecessor to § 368(a)(1)(E). The conclusion concerning the absence of
any relation between the distribution of debentures and exchange of stock, however, was
not dictum because the predecessors to §§ 1036 and 1031(b) might still have been applicable. If there had not been a reorganization and if the distribution of the debentures had
been connected with the exchange of stock, the debentures would have been treated as boot
distributed in a stock-for-stock exchange and therefore taxable at capital gain rates.
183. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
184. 366 F.2d at 890.
185. But see Subchapter C Report, supra note 39, at 2550-51; Subchapter C Revised Report, supra note 39 at 545; J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 798 (1941).
186. 55 T.C. 204 (1970). Judge Sterrett dissented from the court's rejection of the functionally unrelated approach. Id at 233. Judge Quealy agreed with Judge Sterrett. Id at

234, 238.
187. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978), aff'd 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 110 (1980); Estate of Bell, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1971); Gf.Estate
of Hill, 10 T.C. 1090 (1948) (on merger of corporation into newly formed shell, booi taxed
under predecessor of § 356(a)(2). See generally Rose v. United States, 47 A.F.T.R.2d
81-1070, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1981); Commissioner v. Carman, 189 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1951);
Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940).
188. It is possible (but unlikely) that the Tax Court will consider boot functionally
unrelated to the reorganization if the combination of identically owned corporations qualifies as an "F" reorganization. The Tax Court has never been presented with this issue in an
"FI" reorganization. Prior to Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129, the Tax Court agreed with
the Internal Revenue Service that the combination of two or more active corporations
could never be an "F' reorganization. In that ruling the Internal Revenue Service an-
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tion 356(a)(2) "all but superfluous."' 89 It reasoned that the cash
would be considered functionally unrelated whenever it could
have been distributed as a dividend before the reorganization, and
such a distribution would almost always have been possible. The
court also relied on the example in the Committee Reports to the
Revenue Act of 1924 dealing with th6 predecessor of section
356(a)(2).' 9' Although the Tax Court correctly decided that the
example supports the applicability of section 356 to boot distributed in a combination of identically owned corporations, it is
questionable how much weight should be given to fifty-year-old
legislative history which illustrated that the Committees did not
understand the bill they enacted.' 9 ' The example should probably
not be used for anything more than to demonstrate that Congress
a bailout of
enacted the predecessor of section 356(a)(2) to prevent
92
earnings and profits by the transferor corporation.1
Although more recent cases have not followed the functionally
unrelated approach of Davant,t 93 the result in Davant seems correct. The form of the transaction-a cash distribution in connection with the reorganization-is disregarded so that the
94
transaction can be taxed in accordance with its substance.
When the cash is distributed pro rata to shareholders in connection with combinations of identically owned corporations, the substance of the transaction involves no relationship between the cash
nounced its position that certain combinations of two or more active corporations could
qualify as "F" reorganizations if the corporations had related businesses.
Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978), a 'd, 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 110 (1980), was a case where identically owned corporations combined
and boot was distributed. It arose after the publication of Revenue Ruling 75-561. The
Internal Revenue Service had raised the issue of the existence of an "F" reorganization, but
abandoned it in its brief. 70 T.C. at 97 n.4. The business of one of the corporations was
not continued after the reorganization, and the Service presumably concluded that for this
reason the requirements of Revenue Ruling 75-561 had not been met.
189. American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204, 228 (1970).
190. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1924). For an account of the example, see note 43 supra.
191. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
192. See text accompanying notes 137-42 supra.
193. See notes 186-87 supra. The Internal Revenue Service mentioned, but did not
strongly advocate, the functionally unrelated approach in a recent case before the Third
Circuit. Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 864 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S.Ct. 110 (1980).
For authority supporting the functionally unrelated approach, see Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.301-1(i) (1955), 1.331-1(c) (1955); Rev. Rul.
61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62.
194. See Nicholson, Liquidation-Reincorporation,335 TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
A-18 to A-23 (1976).
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and the reorganization. The cash is not a part of an arm's length
business deal. It has no effect on the relative interests of the sharegain
holders in the surviving corporation. The dividend within
95
limitation seems particularly illogical in this situation.1
The form of a transaction is more likely to be disregarded
when there is self-dealing, such as between a corporation and its
shareholders. 196 Thus, the functionally unrelated approach
should be limited to reorganizations involving combinations of
corporations with the same shareholders. When the reorganization involves corporations with different shareholders, the boot
will be part of an arm's length agreement and should not be considered functionally unrelated to the reorganization. The Tax
Court was not necessarily correct when it stated that the functionally unrelated7 approach would make section 356(a)(2) "all but su9
perfluous." 1
Furthermore, the functionally unrelated approach should be
applicable only if the cash or other property is distributed pro rata
to the shareholders. Otherwise, the distribution causes a change
in the relative ownership of the surviving corporation and should
be considered to have become an integral part of the reorganization for this reason.' 9 8 If the boot has this effect on the relative
ownership, the motives of the shareholders in distributing the boot
should be irrelevant. 99
In summary, the boot distributed in amalgamating reorganizations should be taxed under section 301 only when the corporations involved had identical ownership and the boot was
distributed pro rata to shareholders. Because the boot is then
taxed under section 301, it will be a dividend to the extent of the
total amount of current or accumulated earnings and profits. The
195. In contrast, the dividend within gain limitation does not appear illogical when the
corporations combining had no common shareholders. See text accompanying notes 81-84

supra. See also I.R.C. § 304(a).
196. See Bittker, PersuasiveJudicialDoctrines in the Construction of the InternalRevenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 694, 707 (1979); Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the
Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 469 (1968). See generally Gilbert v. Commis-

sioner, 248 F.2d 339, 410 (1957) (Hand, J., dissenting).
197. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
198. The legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 indicates that boot
distributed in recapitalizations should be taxed under § 356. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 437 (1954). See also Rev. Rul. 78-351, 1978-2 C.B. 148. Perhaps boot in recapitalizations should be taxed under § 301, rather than § 356, when the boot is pro rata. This
method would be similar to the rule used for combinations of identically owned corporations.
199. See Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 773 (1978).
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distribution should be considered to be out of the earnings and
profits of any of the corporations involved in the reorganization.
Since the corporations are becoming one entity simultaneously
with the distribution of boot, it seems artificial to conclude that
the distribution is from the earnings and profits of only one of the
corporations. 2°°
Unless the boot is distributed pro rata to shareholders in a
combination of identically owned corporations, it will be taxed
under section 356. If the boot has the effect of a dividend, the
dividend within gain limitation will be applicable even though the
corporations being combined have common ownership. In this
situation, the limitation seems clearly inappropriate, but there
seems to be no alternative under present law.2 0 '
VI.

CONCLUSION

The statutory provisions for taxing boot distributed in
reorganizations have remained basically unchanged since 1924.2 °2
A critical congressional examination of these provisions is overdue. If such an examination should occur, the analysis in this Article presents several suggestions for amending section 356.
The intent of Congress has been that, for the purpose of interpreting section 356, the distribution of nonqualifying property or
boot should be viewed as a substitute for a distribution prior to the
reorganization. As this Article has attempted to demonstrate, this
view of boot should not be changed.20 3 Section 356 should, in
fact, be amended to remove any ambiguity on this matter. The
amendment would demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Shimberg v. United States2° was correct, and that the approach of
the Eighth Circuit in Wright v. United States2 0 5 was incorrect.
A second amendment to section 356 would make the taxation
of distributions in amalgamating reorganizations consistent with
the taxation of property distributions by ongoing corporations. If
the distribution of boot in a reorganization has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend, it should be taxed under sections 301
200. But see Baker, Recent Developments in the Service War Against Liquidation-Reincorporations,49 J. TAX. 82, 83 (1978).
201. See note 6 supra.
202. Changes in related areas, such as the addition of § 306 to the Internal Revenue
Code, have caused changes in the taxation of boot, but the basic provisions affecting the
taxation of boot have been unaffected.
203. See text accompanying notes 143-145 supra.
204. 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
205. 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
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and 316. The dividend within gain limitation of section 356(a)(2)
would be removed, and the question of whether a distribution of
boot is made out of earnings and profits would be answered in the
same way that it is answered for a distribution by an ongoing corporation. If the distribution of boot does not have the effect of the
distribution of a dividend, then gain or loss should be calculated
in a manner analogous to that employed when there is an exchange under section 302(a) or section 346(a)(2). For this calculation, the boot could be considered as exchanged for that
proportion of the distributee's stock in the transferor corporation
which equals the proportion of the boot to the total consideration
received by the distributee.2 °6
Under the present section 356, boot is considered a substitute
for a distribution prior to the reorganization by only the transferor
corporation. 0 7 This limitation should be changed when there is
substantial overlap in the ownership of the corporations combining in a reorganization. 0 8 For example, a third amendment to
section 356 might provide that if the combination qualified as a
reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D) and if the distributee
owned stock in both corporations prior to the reorganization, then
the boot could be considered a substitute for a distribution prior to
reorganization made by either or both corporations. The Internal
Revenue Service would be able to allocate the boot between both
corporations. That allocation would be effective both for determining whether that portion of the boot had the effect of a dividend and whether it was out of earnings and profits. Because the
transaction is a combination of corporations with substantially the
same ownership, it is appropriate that the form of the transaction
be largely disregarded.2 0 9 Such a provision, in combination with
the other changes suggested, would eliminate the need for the substance-over-form approach advocated in this Article for certain
combinations of identically owned corporations. 10
When a combination of corporations does not qualify as a "D"
reorganization, the boot should continue to be considered a substi206. This provision was contained in H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1959) (revised amendments of Advisory Group on Subchapter C of Internal Revenue Code of
1954). See notes 47, 51 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
208. If the distribution qualified as a partial liquidation absent the reorganization, then,
of course, the distribution would not in any event have the effect of a dividend. See text
accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
209. See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
210. See text accompanying notes 193-200 supra.
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tute for a distribution made by only the transferor corporation
prior to the reorganization. This should be the case even when the
distributee had previously owned some stock of the acquiring corporation. The form of the transaction is that the shareholders are
exchanging their stock in the transferor corporation for stock in
the acquiring corporation plus boot. Except for "D" reorganizations, this form comports with the substance and should be
respected for tax purposes.

